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MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND TITLE VII
CLAIMS: CASE LAW GRID ANALYSIS
Janet S. Belcove-Shalin*
The court is confronted with the clash of two deeply held American convictions.
One, embodied in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1991, is to prevent discrimina-
tion; the other, embodied in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, is to protect the free exercise of religion.1
This case presents a collision between two interests of the highest order: the Govern-
ment's interest in eradicating discrimination in employment and the constitutional
right of a church to manage its own affairs free from governmental interference.
2
This case involves the interrelationship between two important governmental direc-
tives - the congressional mandate to eliminate discrimination in the workplace and
the constitutional mandate to preserve the separation of church and state.
3
The above excerpts from recent case law convey a common predicament
that the courts face when dealing with Title VII claims brought by religious
organizations' employees. The problem dates back to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 that was designed to eradicate discrimination based on religion, race,
color, sex, and national origin.4  The courts endorsed this lofty goal, as evi-
denced by the widely quoted statement from EEOC v. Pacific Press, affirming
that "[b]y enacting Title VII, Congress clearly targeted the elimination of all
forms of discrimination as a 'highest priority." 5 Yet, notice the circumspect
"a" rather than the more emphatic "the" in the court dicta. This subtle gram-
matical point captures an ambivalence on the part of the courts which have
struggled to reconcile the goal of equality enunciated by Congress with the
equally honored commitment to religious freedom.
Congress recognized that applying Title VII to religious organizations
may violate their First Amendment rights; henceforth, it exempted religious
employers from the statute's provision prohibiting religion-based discrimina-
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I EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
2 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
3 Combs v. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 351 (5th Cir. 1999).
4 Congress deemed this goal to be urgent, pointing out that "[d]iscrimination is not simply
dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrass-
ment that a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable as a member of
the public because of his race or color." S. REP. No. 88-872, pt. 2, at 2370 (1964).
5 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1280 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing S. REP. No.
88-872, pt. 1, at 11, 24 (1964)).
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tion by enacting § 702.6 Section 702, however, did not relieve religious
employers from liability for employment discrimination in other protected cate-
gories. Thus, when Mrs. Billie McClure, a commissioned church officer of the
Salvation Army, sued the Church because it paid a higher salary to its male
employees than to its female ones,7 it was up to the court to determine if she
had a legitimate claim under Title VII. The McClure court conceded that the
legislative history of § 702 suggests that religious organizations are prohibited
from discriminating against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex, or
national origin.8 Nonetheless, the court found Mrs. McClure's federal action
under Title VII impermissible on First Amendment grounds, citing a long string
of cases stretching from Watson v. Jones9 to Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathe-
dral' ° that upheld church autonomy against government interference. Rather
than declaring the statute unconstitutional, the court argued that since the "rela-
tionship between an organized church and its minister is its lifeblood,"'" Con-
gress could not have possibly intended to regulate church-minister employment
relationships,1 2 and such a relationship must therefore be immune to Title VII
scrutiny. "
This historical holding provided a constitutional mooring for what is vari-
ously referred to as "the ministerial exception,"14 "the McClure exemption,"' 5
"the McClure exception,""' "the church-minister ... exception,"1 7 "the relig-
ious employer exemption,"'" and what has been construed as a blanket exemp-
tion from Title VII judicial review of the employment relationship between a
religious organization and its clergy. The 1999 case of Bollard v. California
Province of the Society of Jesus1 9 is the first by a circuit court to reject a minis-
terial exception defense and exercise jurisdiction in a Title VII claim brought
by a ministerial employee. Significantly, the Bollard court used the grammati-
cally more convincing "the" in its reference to "highest priority" to highlight
the urgency with which Congress set out to fight employment discrimination in
its 1964 Civil Rights Act.20
During the nearly thirty years between McClure and Bollard, the courts
have whittled away at the ministerial exception, trying to square off congres-
6 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (1964).
7 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
8 Id. at 558.
9 Id. at 559 (citing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871)).
10 Id. at 559 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952)).
11 Id. at 558.
12 Id. at 560-61.
13 Id. at 560.
14 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (4th Cir.
1985).
'5 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982).
16 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 1998 WL 273011, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May
15, 1998).
17 Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F.
Supp. 2d 694, 703 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
18 Treaver Hodson, The Religious Employer Exemption Under Title VII: Should a Church
Define Its Own Activities, 1994 BYU L. REv. 571 (1994).
19 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir. 1999).
20 Id.
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sional intent to stamp out employment discrimination with the constitutional
proscription against government interference in church affairs.21 This article
examines the tension between these two conflicting objectives. It differs from
prior studies on the ministerial exception, which fall into two broad categories,
one focusing on individual cases and emerging trends in Title VII judicial con-
2struction, and the other advancing a theoretical model illustrated by select
cases.23 By contrast, the present research attempts to identify the entire uni-
verse of relevant cases - actions filed in federal and state courts under Title VII
by employees working for religious organizations where the employer invoked
the ministerial exception and the court ruled on its applicability to the case at
bar. Part I examines the landmark cases that interpret § 702 and develop the
rationale for the ministerial exception. Part II introduces a Case Law Grid
Analysis (CLGA), a social science methodology for managing large databases,
and shows how the CLGA can be used to track historical trends, spot tensions
in court holdings, identify variables most predictive of case outcomes, and sug-
gest possible alternatives to the Lemon and Sherbert tests currently used for the
First Amendment analysis.
21 See, e.g., EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g
Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982); Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Advent-
ists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985); Ninth & 0 St. Baptist Church v. EEOC, 616 F. Supp.
1231 (W.D. Kan. 1985); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist
Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
22 Barry Burleson, The Applicability of Title VII to Sectarian Schools, 33 BAYLOR L. REv.
380 (1981); Duane E. Okamoto, Religious Discrimination and Title VII Exemption for
Religious Organizations: A Basic Values Analysis for the Proper Allocation of Conflicting
Rights, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1375 (1987); James C. Duda, The Constitutional Analysis of a
"Ministerial Exception" to Title VII: Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh Day
Adventists, 28 B.C. L. REV. 181 (1987); Scott Klundt, Permitting Religious Employers to
Discriminate on the Basis of Religion: Application to For Profit Activities, 1988 BYU L.
REv. 221 (1988); Shelley K. Wessels, The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental
Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1201 (1989); Karen M. Crupi, The Relation-
ship Between Title VII and First Amendment Religion Clauses: The Unconstitutional Schism
of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 53 ALB. L. REv. 421 (1989); Shawna M.
Eikenberry, Thou Shall Not Sue the Church: Denying Court Access to Ministerial Employ-
ees, 74 IND. L.J. 269 (1998).
23 See Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1514 (1979); Douglas Lay-
cock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Rela-
tions and the Rights of Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981); David A.
Fielder, Serving God or Caesar: Constitutional Limits on the Regulation of Religious
Employers, 51 Mo. L. REv. 779 (1986); Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to
Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43
EMORY L.J. 1189 (1994); Hodson, supra note 18.
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PART 1. CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF § 702
1.1. Title VII, Section 702, and the Religious Employer Exemption
On June 26, 1963, President John Kennedy sent a civil rights bill to Con-
gress, urging its members to give the nascent legislation their immediate atten-
tion.2 4 The message accompanying the bill read in part:
The legal remedies I have proposed are the embodiment of this nation's basic posture
of common sense and common justice. They involve every American's right to vote,
to go to school, to get a job and be served in a public place without arbitrary discrimi-
nation - rights which most Americans take for granted.
25
The congressional majority concurred with this judgment:
We believe in the inherent dignity of man. He is born with certain inalienable rights.
His uniqueness is such that we refuse to treat him as if his rights and well-being are
bargainable. All vestiges of inequality based solely on race must be removed in
order to preserve our democratic society, to maintain our country's leadership, and to
enhance mankind.
26
The Civil Rights Act of 1963, as the bill was known in its early days, was
substantially different from the measure Congress enacted a year later. The bill
sent to the House Judiciary Committee sought protection from discrimination
based on "race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry. ' 27 Controversy
surrounding the bill escalated when Congressman Howard Smith, a staunch
opponent of the civil rights bill, offered an amendment that included sex among
the protected categories, a measure aimed to prevent discrimination against
what he gleefully called a "minority sex."2 8 When Congressman Smith intro-
duced his measure, "[t]he House erupted in shock as the full import of the
amendment sank in."' 29 As Smith made clear, this was part of a calculated
strategy to make the Civil Rights Act "as full of booby traps as a dog is full of
fleas."3
Congressman Emmanuel Cellar, Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee and a strong supporter of the civil rights movement, opposed the amend-
ment. He cited the Presidential Committee on the Status of Women to the
effect that "discrimination based on sex involves problems sufficiently different
from discrimination based on the other factors listed to make separate treatment
preferable."3 1 Clearly, Cellar spumed the amendment for the same reason that
Smith advocated it: the measure was widely believed to be certain to kill the
24 CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE 2 (1985).
25 Id. at 1 (quoting John Kennedy, The Legal Remedies, PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 493 (1963)).
26 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2 at 2517. Some proponents of the Civil Rights Act were reluctant to
use such strong language, having found it anachronistic: "Religious prejudices have largely
disappeared. Ethnic origin discrimination is no longer existent. Race prejudice is rapidly
being stamped out." Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 87-1370, at 22 (1974)).
27 H.R. REP. No. 88-914, at 87 (1974).
28 110 CONG. REc. 2484 (1964).
29 WHALEN, supra note 24, at 115.
30 Id. at 116.
31 110 CONG. REc. 2485 (1964).
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entire bill. Ultimately, Smith's poison pill strategy backfired. The amendment
passed the House with a vote of 168 to 133. Women, who were not initially
among Title VII direct beneficiaries, formed a "new constituency that success-
fully worked for retention of the sex protection clause as well as for Senate
passage of the measure."32
Several other controversial amendments to the Civil Rights Act were
offered on the House floor, some meant to expand the statute's reach, others to
create new discrimination classes. Congressman John Dowdy urged his col-
leagues to include "age" among the protected categories, castigating age bias as
the "worst kind of discrimination."3 3 This amendment was defeated by a vote
of 123 to 94. The motions to exclude communist party members and atheists
from the Title VII protection against "unlawful employment practices" carried;
the former would eventually become law and the latter would be struck down
by the Senate as a provision of "doubtful constitutionality. 34
Once House Bill 7152 made it to the Senate floor, a group of southern
senators began a filibuster, one of them calling the bill "a punitive expedition
into the South."35 In response, the nation's religious leaders weighed in on the
debate, adding a strong voice in support of the bill. Civil rights activists from
around the nation descended on Capitol Hill and mounted a massive lobbying
campaign. Two hundred clergymen from forty-one states traveled to Washing-
ton D.C. to solicit their representatives. Seminaries from different parts of the
country dispatched their students to conduct a round-the-clock vigil at the Lin-
coln Memorial.36 The protesters' prayers were answered on June 10, 1964,
when the Senate finally mustered the sixty-seven votes to end the 534-hour
filibuster, the longest in our nation's history, and passed the Civil Rights Act of
1964 - a statute unprecedented in its depth and scope. This legislation put
every employer and federal agency on notice that racism would no longer be
tolerated. It provided an enforcement mechanism in the form of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission endowed with subpoena power and the
right to sue biased employers. And, it gave blacks, women, and religious
minorities strong protections against discrimination in the workplace.
Among the many ironies that marked this national debate was the exemp-
tion for religious employers from Title VII strictures. The House version of the
bill contained a § 703, which gave religious employers blanket exemption from
Title VII provisions: "This title shall not apply ... to a religious corporation,
association, or society."3 7 Much of the lobbying that clergymen conducted on
behalf of the bill was done on the assumption that this exemption would
become the law of the land. Hopes were dashed on May 18, 1964, when the
Senate debate on the pending bill got under way. Senator Hubert Humphrey
offered Substitute Senate Amendment No. 656 which drastically narrowed the
32 WHALEN, supra note 24, at 234.
33 110 CONG. REC. 2503 (1964).
34 110 CONG. REC. 12,297 (1964).
35 WHALEN, supra note 24, at 184.
36 Id. at 184.
37 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting H.R.
REP. No. 88-914, at 10 (1963), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative History of Title VII and XI
of Civil Rights Act of 1964 at 2010 (1968) ("1964 Legis. Hist.") 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355).
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original exemption by permitting religious organizations to discriminate in
employment matters only on religious grounds, and then, only in connection
with religious activities carried out by such institutions. Section 703, renum-
bered as § 702, now reads as follows:
This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the employment of aliens
outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, or society with respect to
the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on by such corporation, association, or society of its religious activ-
ities or to an educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to
perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution.
3 8
In 1972, Congress revisited the statute, with several Senators endeavoring
to revive the original version of § 702 that exempted religious institutions from
Title VII claims. Senator Allen contended that, under the existing statute, athe-
ists could sue parochial schools for refusing to hire them.39 To stamp out such
an oddity, Senators proposed to delete the word "religious" in the phrase "relig-
ious activities" contained in § 702 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.40 The "Ervin-
Allen Amendment," as the measure would be dubbed, extended the religious
exemption to parochial schools and educational institutions of higher learning
and allowed religious employers to discriminate in favor of coreligionists in a
wide range of church-related activities regardless of such activities' religious
content. Senator Erwin explained, "this amendment is to take the political
hands of Caesar off of the institutions of God, where they have no place to
be.
,4 1
As amended in 1972, § 702 gave religious employers greater latitude in
hiring and firing their employees who did not conform to their ecclesiastical
beliefs, yet it also left religious employers liable for other forms of job-related
discrimination. Thus, while Title VII had the potential to revamp employment
relations in the religious domain by making the church vulnerable to EEOC
subpoena powers, it also threatened to breach the wall between church and
state. As such, this legislation was bound to raise serious questions regarding
the statutes' constitutionality under the First Amendment's Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses. McClure v. Salvation Army4 2 and King's Garden, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Commission4 3 offered two different modes of judi-
cial construction used by courts for Title VII claims.
1.2. McClure, King's Garden, and the Religious Employer Exemption
Title VII, as enacted in 1964, had one particularly startling implication
that seems to have escaped notice at the time: the statute was at loggerheads
with the venerable institution of an all-male clergy. Taken literally, Title VII
prohibitions could be invoked against sex-based preferences in clergy appoint-
ments. Hence, the statute made the church vulnerable to claims by female
38 Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 702, 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 287, 304 (78 Stat.) 241.
39 King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972, 844 (Nov. 1972)).
40 Id. (quoting Amendment 809 to S. 2515, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 789).
41 Id. (quoting Amendment 809 to S. 2515, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 1645).
42 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
4' King's Garden, 498 F.2d at 51.
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employees who found their working conditions inferior to men. It was only a
matter of time before such claims found their way to the courts.
McClure v. Salvation Army" is the first case where a female pastor chal-
lenged church employment policies privileging male employees. Mrs.
McClure, a church officer, brought a federal action under Title VII alleging that
her employer, the Salvation Army, engaged in discriminatory practices based
on sex by offering her less salary and fewer benefits than to her male counter-
parts.45 She also alleged that the church discharged her because of complaints
to her supervisors and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and
later filed a supplementary complaint that asked the court to consider the suit as
a class action on behalf of all current and former female officers of the Salva-
tion Army.4 6 McClure lost in the lower court, then appealed to the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The church moved for summary judgment, claiming a religious
exemption under § 702 of Title VII.
The McClure court examined § 702 and confirmed that "Congress did not
intend that a religious organization be exempted from liability for discriminat-
ing against employees on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin."4
Yet, such a literal construction inevitably raised a constitutional question:
"Does the application of Title VII to the relationship between The Salvation
Army and Mrs. McClure (a church and its minister) violate either of the Relig-
ion Clauses of the First Amendment?"48 To salvage the statute from the consti-
tutional turmoil, the court gave § 702 a broad interpretation that immunized
religious employers from the type of claims brought by McClure. The court
held that "Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the
applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship
between church and minister."49
According to the Fifth Circuit's construction of § 702, a religious entity
can discriminate against its ministers based on any and all Title VII protected
categories. Dismissing Mrs. McClure's claim "for lack of jurisdiction,"5° the
court established a standard for subsequent rulings construing the church-min-
ister employment relationship as invulnerable to Title VII challenges.
The McClure court observed that ever since the 1871 Watson v. Jones
decision, "the Supreme Court began to place matters of church government and
administration beyond the purview of civil authorities.""1 In 1929, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed this precept in Gonzales v. Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop. The Court held that the decisions of church leaders on purely ecclesi-
astical matters must be accepted as conclusive, despite their effect on civil
rights.52 In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, the McClure court further
observed that "the principle announced by Watson and Gonzalez became a con-
44 McClure, 460 F.2d at 553.
41 Id. at 555.
46 Id. at 555-56.
47 Id. at 558.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 560-61.
50 Id. at 554.
5' Id. at 559.
52 Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
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stitutional prohibition,-5 3 as the Supreme Court held that legislation regulating
church administration, operations or clerical appointments prohibits the free
exercise of religion.5 4
More recently, in Sherbert v. Verner, the Supreme Court reiterated its
strong support for church autonomy, pointing out that,
[o]nly in rare instances where a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a sub-
ject within the State's constitutional power to regulate" is shown can a court uphold
state action which imposes even an "incidental burden" on the free exercise of relig-
ion. In this highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest of abuses, endan-
gering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation."
55
The McClure court then issued what is probably the most quoted opinion
in this line of cases:
The relationship between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The
minister is the chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Mat-
ters touching this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of primary ecclesias-
tical concern. Just as the initial function of selecting a minister is a matter of church
administration and government, so are the functions which accompany such a selec-
tion. It is unavoidably true that these include the determination of a minister's salary,
his place of assignment, and the duty he is to perform in the furtherance of the relig-
ious mission.
56
Two years after McClure, King's Garden, Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission construed § 702 in a way that raised questions about the
constitutionality of the religious employer exemption as amended by Congress
in 1972. 57 In King's Garden, the plaintiff was not an ordained minister seeking
to resolve an intra-church dispute, but a job applicant who applied for a posi-
tion at an interdenominational, religious, nonprofit radio station and who was
beset by questions about his religious beliefs.58 The plaintiff contacted the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which filed a lawsuit on his
behalf, alleging religion-based discrimination, an actionable offense under Title
VII. The FCC determined that King's Garden, a beneficiary of the federal
broadcasting license operating outside of the traditional religious realm, dis-
criminated in its employment practices on religious grounds. 9 King's Garden
appealed to the D.C. Circuit based on the religious employer exemption under
§ 702 of Title VII.6 ° The D.C. Circuit court affirmed the FCC's ruling in lan-
guage that bares animosity toward § 702 and religious employers trying to
shield themselves from Title VII scrutiny:
The 1972 exemption is of very doubtful constitutionality.... In covering all of the
"activities" of any "religious corporation, association, educational institution, or soci-
ety," the exemption immunizes virtually every endeavor undertaken by a religious
organization.
6 1
53 McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
54 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
55 McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
56 Id. at 558-59.
57 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
58 Id. at 52.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 53.
61 Id. at 53-55.
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In an allusion to the McClure court reading of the statute, the court opined
that
[w]hile it is not uncommon for courts to come very close to rewriting statutes so as to
save their constitutionality, the 1972 exemption is a poor candidate for such a salvage
operation.... In creating this gross distinction between the rules facing religious and
non-religious entrepreneurs, Congress placed itself on collision course with the
Establishment Clause. Laws in this country must have a secular purpose and a "pri-
mary effect" which neither advances nor inhibits religion. 62
Having concluded that this exemption amounts to government sponsor-
ship,63 the King's Garden court granted the FCC, a federal agency, enforce-
ment rights to bring King's Garden in line with the Title VII requirements. The
court concludes with the admonishment that
it is very dangerous indeed to inflate a constitutionally doubtful statute into a
"national policy" having force beyond the statute's literal command. The customary,
and more prudent, course is to construe statutes so as to avoid, rather than aggravate,
constitutional difficulties.
64
McClure and King's Garden do not lend themselves to a ready compari-
son, for the fact patterns they address are substantially different. What makes
these two cases relevant for the present purpose is the direction the two circuit
courts move in construing the religious employer exemption. On the one hand,
McClure expands the religious employer exemption and makes it unlimited
insofar as it applies to church-minister employment. On the other hand, King's
Garden heaps scorn on the exemption, using it as an example of legislative
activism of dubious constitutionality designed to subvert the intent behind the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Whereas one court is leaning on the First Amend-
ment Religion Clauses to prove that the state should leave administrative deci-
sions concerning employees to the church, the other argues that the state loses
its neutrality vis-a-vis religious organizations when the state allows them to
discriminate in hiring for its less sectarian enterprises. The McClure court was
trying to save § 702 from constitutional challenges by expanding its reach.
King's Garden followed the same constitutional agenda by advocating the stat-
ute's radical reduction. Both rationales would figure prominently in subse-
quent decisions.
1.3 Mississippi College, Rayburn, and the Ministerial Exception
In Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Mississippi College,6 5
the Fifth Circuit clarified its reasoning in McClure in light of the Free Exercise
holdings in Sherbert and Lemon, 6 6 two landmark Supreme Court decisions.
The court also affirmed the EEOC's right to enforce Title VII against religious
62 Id. at 55. The King's Garden court also found the religious exemption "unconstitutional
on Fifth Amendment grounds. To the extent that the non-religious commercial enterprises of
religious organizations directly compete with those of non-religious organizations, the 1972
exemption forces the Government to discriminate between business rivals in applying the
Civil Rights Act's constraint on sectarian hiring." Id. at 57.
63 Id. at 55.
64 Id. at 57.
65 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
66 Id. at 486-88.
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institutions discriminating against nonreligious function employees.67 For its
part, Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists68 codified the
ministerial exception and applied it to non-ordained church employees engaged
in predominantly religious activities.
In Mississippi College, Dr. Patricia Summers, a part-time assistant profes-
sor teaching psychology at a college run by the Mississippi Baptist Convention,
filed a sex discrimination suit against her employer after her application for a
full-time position in the Department was turned down and a male psychologist
was hired for the job. She later amended her complaint to include additional
charges that the college discriminated against women as a class in matters
involving employment qualifications, promotions, recruitment, salary, and
race.
6 9
The EEOC asked the college to provide relevant personnel information,
and after the administration declined to do so, issued a subpoena seeking data
about race, salary, and promotion on every faculty and staff member in the
college. The college urged the EEOC to rescind its subpoena, arguing that
the administration's hiring decision was based on the fact that Mrs. Summers
joined a Presbyterian Church (the faith of her husband), and that the psychol-
ogy department was looking for an instructor specializing in experimental psy-
chology, not Mrs. Summers' primary area of expertise.7 °
At that point, the EEOC turned to the district court to enforce the sub-
poena. The district court held that since Mississippi College was a religious
educational institution under § 702, the EEOC could not investigate Summers'
employment discrimination claims as it would inhibit the college's preference
in hiring Baptists and thus entangle church and state.71 With the district court
declining to enforce the subpoena, the EEOC filed a motion with the Fifth
Circuit to confirm its authority to inquire into potential employment discrimina-
tion under § 710 of Title VII.
The Fifth Circuit vacated the lower court's decision. It held that the plain-
tiff - a white woman - had standing to file a charge asserting that Mississippi
College discriminates against blacks. 72 With regard to religion-based discrimi-
nation, the Fifth Circuit declined to grant the college a ministerial exception,
pointing out that the college's reliance on McClure was unfounded:
73
The College is not a church. The College's faculty and staff do not function as
ministers.... They neither attend to the religious needs of the faithful nor instruct
students in the whole of religious doctrine. . . . The employment relationship
between Mississippi College and its faculty and staff is one intended by Congress to
be regulated by Title VII.
7 4
67 Id. at 483.
68 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
69 Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d at 479-80.
70 Id. at 480.
71 Id. at 481.
72 Id. at 483.
73 Id. at 485.
74 Id.
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The ministerial exception must be granted, the Fifth Circuit court contin-
ued, only if the district court determines on remand that the college preferred
Baptists over non-Baptists in its hiring practices.75
The Mississippi College court reiterated the First Amendment argument it
deployed in McClure by drawing on two recent Supreme Court decisions.
While in its McClure ruling, the Fifth Circuit concentrated on the Free Exercise
Clause rationale for the ministerial exception, this time the court gave equal
attention to the Establishment Clause argument in Lemon v. Kurtzman, where
the Supreme Court issued guidelines for ascertaining whether a congressional
mandate violates the establishment clause.7 6 Paraphrasing the Supreme Court's
argument in Lemon, the Fifth Circuit articulated a three-prong test for deter-
mining if the statute passed constitutional muster. One must establish: "(1)
whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose, (2) whether the principal
or primary effect of the statute is neither to advance nor inhibit religion, and (3)
whether the statute fosters 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion.' ,7
Drawing on the 1972 Supreme Court decisions in Wisconsin v. Yoder and
Sherbert v. Verner, the Fifth Circuit elaborated on its Free Exercise analysis
advanced in McClure with another three-pronged test for the constitutionality
of the governmental actions.
In determining whether a statutory enactment violates the free exercise of a sincerely
held religious belief, the Supreme Court has examined (1) the magnitude of the stat-
ute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief, (2) the existence of a compel-
ling state interest justifying the burden imposed upon the exercise of the religious
belief, and (3) the extent to which recognition of an exemption from the statute
would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the state.7 8
Having applied these two tests to Mississippi College's claim to protection
under § 702, the court held that the compelling interest test, in eradicating dis-
crimination, justifies the minimal burden the government imposes upon the
college.7 9
In Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 80 the
Fourth Circuit supported McClure by granting an exemption from Title VII
scrutiny to a church, while at the same time reaffirming Mississippi College's
emphasis on the limited nature of the religious employer exemption. The case
involved a woman who was denied a pastoral position in the Seventh-Day
Adventist Church and who charged her employer "with sexual and racial dis-
75 Id.
76 Id. at 486.
77 Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)).
78 Id. at 488 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963).
79 Id. at 489. The court's rationale was the following:
Although the number of religious educational institutions is minute in comparison to the number
of employers subject to Title VII, their effect upon society at large is great because of the role
they play in educating society's young. If the environments in which such institutions seek to
achieve their religious and educational goals reflect unlawful discrimination, those discrimina-
tory attitudes will be perpetuated with an influential segment of society. Id.
80 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
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crimination under Title VII.' t8 1 Carole Raybum, a white female member of the
church with a Ph.D. in psychology and Master of Divinity degree from Andrew
University, simultaneously applied for an Associate Pastoral Care internship
and Associate Pastor position at the Sligo Seventh-Day Adventist Church. The
associate pastor position was open to women, although "women may not stand
for ordination" as ministers in this church.82 After the position was offered to
another woman, plaintiff filed a civil action "alleging discrimination on the
basis of her sex, her association with black persons, her membership in black-
oriented religious organizations, and her opposition to practices made unlawful
by Title VH."8 3 The EEOC examined Rayburn's complaint and issued a right-
to-sue letter, upon which plaintiff filed a suit in district court. Having estab-
lished that plaintiff had a commissioned minister license, the court held that the
First Amendment barred a Title VII suit in this case.84 Rayburn appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, maintaining that she was not an ordained minister and that,
consequently, the McClure exception does not shield the church from Title VII
scrutiny."
The application of Title VII to this case raises constitutional questions, the
Rayburn court noted, for the record indicates that Congress intended to exempt
religious institutions only in connection with the church's religious activities
and in regard to employment discrimination based on religion. The Rayburn
court grounded its position in First Amendment cases justifying the religious
employer exemption in the name of church autonomy and religious freedom.8 6
After balancing state interests against First Amendment rights, the Ray-
burn court concluded that even though Rayburn was not an ordained minister,
her claim under Title VII must be denied, for the church's freedom to choose
its officers charged with pastoral duties outweigh the officers' rights under
Title VII.8 7 In issuing its decision, the Rayburn court used, apparently for the
first time in case law history, the expression "ministerial exception": "The fact
that an associate in pastoral care can never be an ordained minister in her
church is likewise immaterial. The 'ministerial exception' to Title VII first
articulated in McClure v. Salvation Army ... does not depend on ordination but
upon the function of the position ... ""
The court quoted an influential article by Bruce N. Bagni which offered
guidelines in ascertaining which church-sponsored activity had a bona-fide pas-
toral content and conferred on a church employee a ministerial function, and by
implication, immunized such an employment relationship from Title VII scru-
81 Id. at 1164-65.
82 Id. at 1165.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1165-67.
85 Id.
86 The Rayburn court noted:
The "wall of separation" between church and state... has become a "variable barrier,".... as
Congress has enacted comprehensive legislation to achieve desirable goals. Tensions have
developed between our cardinal Constitutional principles of freedom of religion, on the one
hand, and our national attempt to eradicate all forms of discrimination, on the other.
Id. at 1167 (citations omitted).
87 Id. at 1167-68.
88 Id. at 1168.
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tiny. "As a general rule, if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he should be con-
sidered 'clergy.' ,
89
There is a dual agenda propelling the Mississippi College and Rayburn
courts in their construction of Title VII and the § 702 exemption. Both courts
reaffirmed that the religious employer exemption is solidly grounded in the
First Amendment Religion Clauses, both drew attention to the religious content
of the job performed, and both took pains to emphasize the narrow nature of the
exemption granted to religious institutions. The fact that the institution in ques-
tion is religious does not automatically confer on it the right to claim a § 702
exemption. While both holdings problematized the job function as key to deter-
mining the availability of the ministerial exception defense, neither settled the
issues of which activities are genuinely religious, which employees are ministe-
rial in their primary duties, and which behavior by pastoral workers can be held
against them as inconsistent with their ministerial responsibilities. It was left to
subsequent judicial findings to delineate the practical scope of the ministerial
exception and the range of employment situations within its reach.
1.4. Amos, Smith, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Ever since Congress granted an exemption to religious employers, doubts
about § 702 and its constitutionality continued to surface in various court dicta.
As one strongly worded opinion stated:
The exemption presently afforded by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l, is a remarkably
clumsy accommodation of religious freedom with the compelling interests of the
state, providing on the one hand far too broad a shield for the secular activities of
religiously affiliated entities with not the remotest claim to first amendment protec-
tion while on the other hand permitting intrusions into wholly religious activities.
9 0
It was in light of such lower courts' animosity toward § 702 that the
Supreme Court agreed to review a religious exemption case in Corporation of
the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos. 91 The case involved a district court decision to refuse a religious
employer exemption to a Mormon church-operated gymnasium that had dis-
charged a nonreligious function employee - a building engineer - who lost his
church accreditation. 92 According to the lower court opinion, the fact that
plaintiff "failed to qualify for . . . a certificate that he is a member of the
Church" does not deprive him of Title VII protection against religion-based
discrimination, nor does the instant fact situation entitle the employer to the
ministerial exception defense.93 The district court took a close look at § 702
and "declared the statute unconstitutional as applied to secular activity ... and
ordered [plaintiff] reinstated with back pay."94
89 Id. at 1169 (quoting Bagni, supra note 23, at 1545).
90 Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D. Mass 1983); see also
Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
91 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 330.
94 Id.
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The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. Citing the recent holding in
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission of Florida, the Court pointed
out that the government can accommodate religious practices without violating
the Establishment Clause.95 The Court went on to state that "[t]he limits of
permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means coextensive with
noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause,"9 6 and that "[t]here is
ample room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interfer-
ence.',9 The Court concluded that the judiciary should not be placed in the
position of trying to figure out which church activity constitutes a genuine
religious exercise, nor should the courts make churches guess the likely ruling
in the matter.9 8 All church-related activities have a spiritual dimension and
thus can be filled by those who share the church's tenets, with § 702 shielding
the employer from Title VII scrutiny:
[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of sub-
stantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider relig-
ious. The line is hardly a bright one, and the organization might understandably be
concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mis-
sion.... It cannot be seriously contended that § 702 impermissibly entangles church
and state; the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids the
kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that the District Court engaged in this
case. The statute easily passes muster under the third part of the Lemon test.99
Not every Supreme Court Justice was ready to grant § 702 a clean bill of
health. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which she expressed
reservations about the majority position insofar as it blurred the distinction
between profit and nonprofit organizations and failed "to separate those bene-
fits to religion that constitutionally accommodate the free exercise of religion
from those that provide unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organiza-
tions."' 1 The key point Justice O'Connor made was that the courts cannot let
the church be the sole judge of which of its enterprises are religious in nature
without the risk of giving church-sponsored for-profit enterprises an unfair
advantage in the market place. The Lemon inquiry into the possible state inter-
ference in church affairs must be conducted first in order to determine whether
"lifting from religious organizations a generally applicable regulatory burden
... does have the effect of advancing religion."1 °1
91 Id. at 334 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136,
144-45 (1987)).
96 Id. (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970)).
97 Id. (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 669).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 336-39.
100 Id. at 346-48. This opinion echoes the King's Garden court's warning that "the whole-
sale exemption for religious organizations alone can only be seen as a special preference...
[insofar as] the exemption's benefits clearly extend to the non-religious, commercial enter-
prises of sectarian organizations." King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 55-57 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
101 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987).
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Justice O'Connor's reference to "a generally applicable regulatory bur-
den" is indicative of the subsequent history of § 702 construction. It anticipates
the language the Supreme Court would use two years later in Employment Divi-
sion, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 10 2 a controversial
decision potentially impacting the ministerial exemption. This case involved
two Native Americans fired from their jobs and denied unemployment benefits
after they smoked peyote in a traditional religious ceremony at their Native
American Church - an illegal act under the Oregon law prohibiting peyote use
of any kind. The Supreme Court held that as long as the Oregon law defined
peyote as an illegal substance and proscribed its use, the state unemployment
agency could deny plaintiffs' unemployment benefits in the case at bar, even
though the practice in question had an undeniable sacramental significance.103
The defendants asked for a compelling state interest test to be applied to their
case in the hope that their First Amendment rights would outweigh the Oregon
prohibition, but the Court demurred: "We have never invalidated any govern-
ment action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment
compensation .... In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sher-
bert test... at all."' ' The correct question, the Court declared, is whether "a
neutral, generally applicable regulatory law"' 05 prohibiting certain behavior
can be superseded by religious belief prescribing such behavior. The Court
gave a resounding "no" to this question, citing several cases dating back to the
1879 Reynolds v. United States case where this general precept was upheld:
"We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuses him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is
free to regulate.""0 6
This ruling created some confusion, for it appeared to have waived the
Sherbert test in any area outside the unemployment compensation field and
mandated a "neutral, generally applicable regulatory law" standard for deciding
whether religiously inspired practice could be banned. Drawing upon this
logic, some claimants suing religious employers argued that "Title VII is just
such a generally applicable law and that under Smith, [a religious entity] should
not be insulated from its mandate." 10 7 However, the argument fell on deaf
ears. Courts were unwilling to go against precedent and invalidate the constitu-
tionally-mandated religious employer exemption in the face of the congres-
sional ban on employment discrimination. The EEOC recognized this fact in
102 494 U.S. 872 (1989).
103 Id. at 878-79.
104 Id. at 883.
105 Id. at 880.
106 Id. at 878-79. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
107 Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1130 (Colo. 1996). In Vigars v. Valley Christian
Ctr., Justice Henderson made this characteristic remark:
Had this case come before me two years ago, I would have had to employ a three part balancing
test .... However, in 1991, the Supreme Court "dramatically altered the manner in which we
evaluate free exercise complaints .... " American Friends Service Committee v. Thornburgh,
951 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1991). As recognized by the 9th Circuit in American Friends, free exer-
cise claims must now fail "if prohibiting the exercise of religion ... is not the object of the [law]
but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision ..
805 F. Supp. 802, 809 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (citations omitted in part).
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its 1990 policy statement, reaffirmed in 1998, which directed the agency's
employees to examine the relationship between the individual and the church
on a case by case basis before deciding which individual qualifies as clergy
under the ministerial exception.1
0 8
Upset by the implication of Smith, Congress sought to revive the Sherbert
test as a tool for weighing state interests against Free Exercise rights. The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) was expressly designed
"(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner...
and guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is sub-
stantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government."'" This statute
cast a long shadow over the ministerial exception, adding legal ammunition to
plaintiffs seeking remedies against employment discrimination under Title
VII," ' until RFRA was held to be unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. F.F.
Flores. I" ' Henceforth, courts have typically upheld § 702 out of deference to
the religious employers' constitutional rights.
Looking back at the judicial construction of § 702 in Amos, it is hard to
disagree with Justice O'Connor's opinion that the majority "seems to . . .
obscure far more than to enlighten."' 2 The Court's holding that the judiciary
should not second guess the church as to which of its enterprises are religious
in nature, begs the question as to where permissible "accommodation" of relig-
ion becomes an impermissible "establishment" thereof. To be impermissible
under Lemon, according to the Amos majority, the law must actively promote a
particular religion." 3 But the Court's hands-off policy that allows churches to
decide which of their activities are religious, and consequently reserve them for
coreligionists, does confer on religious entities unfair advantages when it
comes to their profit-making ventures. Under the guise of avoiding entangle-
ment, the Amos ruling tacitly aids churches competing with nonreligious com-
mercial enterprises by denying the latter the benefits that § 702 bestows on
religious employers. In this sense, § 702 transpires not so much as a neutral
statute but as a special treatment law that applies only to religious institutions
and privileges their for-profit ventures over similar secular undertakings.
The confrontation between the judiciary and the legislative branches occa-
sioned by Smith further clouded the matter by sowing doubts about the Sher-
bert test's relevance to Title VII jurisprudence. If a "neutral" statute of
"general applicability" overrides free exercise considerations, then Title VII is
a prime candidate for the part. If the ministerial exception outweighs the state
interest in nondiscrimination, then First Amendment rights take precedence
over compelling state interests. Alas, both interests are compelling, each repre-
sents the government's highest priority, and neither can be subordinated to the
108 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 506 n.2 (E.N.D.C. 1999) (quot-
ing EEOC POLICY STATEMENT, No. N-915.049, 2/11/90).
109 42 U.S.C. § 2000(b) (Supp. V 1993).
"o See Van Osdol, 908 P.2d 1122.
"1 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
112 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 347 (1987).
113 Id. at 337.
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other without a meaningful test - a test that the majority in Smith found to be
unnecessary, if not wrong-headed. Given this confusion, it is not surprising
that in Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus, the Ninth Circuit
reverted to the Sherbert test in its landmark 1999 decision which added a new
twist to the § 702 judicious construction.
1.5. Van Osdol, Bollard, and the Limits of the Ministerial Exception
The last two cases to be introduced in this survey of the § 702 judicial
construction are Van Osdol v. Vogt' l4 and Bollard v. California Province of the
Society of Jesus.ll' These two cases stand out because they entail nearly iden-
tical fact situations - a ministerial function employee filing a Title VII claim
alleging sexual harassment - yet each produced a different outcome, with the
ministerial exception granted in the former case and denied in the latter.
Van Osdol worked as a minister at the United Churches of Religious Sci-
ences under the supervision of a senior minister, Hugh Vogt, who also hap-
pened to be her stepfather.'6 Plaintiff alleged that her stepfather sexually
harassed her as a child. When Van Osdol informed the Ecclesiastical Commit-
tee about these events and suspected similar abuses involving other church
employees, defendant denied the charges, after which the Ecclesiastical Com-
mittee revoked her novitiate license and reversed its earlier decision allowing
her to open a new church.'
1 7
The Supreme Court of Colorado granted certiorari on two issues:
(1) whether the First Amendment precludes a court from exercising jurisdiction over
a minister's tort and Title VII claims against her church and another minister, and (2)
whether the "fraud" and "collusion" exceptions to the First Amendment defense are
viable claims when a minister is discharged in retaliation for reporting the miscon-
duct of another minister. 
118
After applying the Sherbert and Lemon tests," 9 the court declined to exer-
cise jurisdiction over the claims pertaining to the employment termination
because a decision to hire or fire a minister entails religious judgments concern-
ing the extent to which a clerical worker embodies the church doctrine. 20 The
Van Osdol court affirmed and remanded the lower court decision with instruc-
114 Van Osdol, 908 P.2d 1122.
115 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999).
116 Van Osdol, 908 P.2d at 1124-25.
117 Id. The defendants - Mr. Vogt, the Mile Hi Church of Religious Science, et al. - moved
to dismiss the case. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss on several claims, includ-
ing breach of contract, assault, outrageous conduct, and breach of fiduciary duty, but dis-
claimed jurisdiction on claims of negligent hiring, negligent supervision, negligent retention
of Vogt, compensatory and punitive damages, back pay, and future pay in lieu of reinstate-
ment on the ground that such claims are barred by the First Amendment. Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 1127-31.
120 Id. at 1128-29. See Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist
Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that it does not matter whether the
factors relied upon by the church were independently ecclesiastical or not, for since they
relate to a pastoral appointment decision they are automatically intertwined with religious
doctrine).
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tions to review the case consistent with this judgment of the Supreme Court of
Colorado. 121
In Bollard, a novice at a Roman Catholic order brought a Title VII claim
against his church and immediate supervisors who sent him pornographic
materials, made sexual advances, and engaged him in unwelcome sexual dis-
cussions. 122 Plaintiff filed a complaint, charging a hostile work environment so
severe that he left the Jesuits prior to taking his vows.' 23 The district court
applied the ministerial exception to the case, invalidating Bollard's Title VII
claim.'2 4 Plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit which granted jurisdiction
over the claims.
Knowing that this was the first time the Ninth Circuit was asked to define
the scope of § 702,12' the judges held that the "so-called 'ministerial exception'
* . . insulates a religious organization's employment decisions regarding its
ministers from judicial scrutiny under Title VII.' 126 The court stressed that the
"source of the ministerial exception is the Constitution rather than the stat-
ute."' 127 The court went on to explain:
Because the plain language of Title VII purports to reach a church's employment
decisions regarding its ministers, courts have had to carve a ministerial exception out
of Title VII in order to reconcile the statute with the Constitution. Despite of the lack
of a statutory basis for the ministerial exception, and despite Congress's apparent
intent to apply Title VII to religious organizations as to any other employer, courts
have uniformly concluded that the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment require a narrowing construction of Title VII in order to insulate
the relationship between a religious organization and its ministers from constitution-
ally impermissible interference by governments.
1 28
Up to this point, the Bollard court took the familiar route, citing the
Kedroff line of cases 129 that anchor church autonomy in the Constitution and
warn against state interference in the church's administrative affairs. Thereaf-
ter, however, the judges proceeded to lay out a rationale that would allow a
ministerial function employee to prevail in his Title VII action against the stan-
dard ministerial exception defense. In spite of the fact that the Sherbert and
Lemon tests came under critical scrutiny in Smith, the court applied both to the
case at bar.
With regard to the issue of free exercise, the judges wove a carefully rea-
soned argument demonstrating that there is no danger of "substantive entangle-
ment" in this case, since the trial calls for "a restricted inquiry" where
"[niothing in the character of this defense will require a jury to evaluate relig-
ious doctrine or the reasonableness of religious practices followed within the
Jesuit order."' 3 No First Amendment problems impede this case with regard
121 Id. at 1134.
122 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 945.
126 Id. at 944.
127 Id. at 945.
128 Id. at 946-47
129 Id. at 945-46.
130 Id. at 950.
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to "procedural entanglement," as well, for the plaintiff "seeks neither reinstate-
ment nor any other equitable relief that might require continuing court
surveillance." '131
Weighing the free exercise issues, the Bollard court concluded that "the
Free Exercise rationales supporting an exception to Title VII are missing" in
this case, since "Jesuits do not offer a religious justification for the harassment
Bollard alleges." '132 While relying heavily on Sherbert and Lemon, the Ninth
Circuit also alluded to Smith, as it rejected the defendant's argument about the
inevitable entanglement the ruling for the plaintiff would entail:
And while we recognize that applying any laws to religious institutions necessarily
interferes with the unfettered autonomy churches would otherwise enjoy, this sort of
generalized and diffuse concern for church autonomy, without more, does not exempt
them from the operation of secular laws. Otherwise, churches would be free from all
of the secular legal obligations that currently and routinely apply to them.
133
"Taken as a whole," the court held,
we conclude that the procedural entanglement between church and state that will
result from allowing Bollard to pursue his claim is no greater than that attendant on
any other civil suit a private litigant might pursue against a church. Accordingly, we
fail to see an Establishment Clause violation in applying the commands of Title VII
to this case.
134
Comparing the above two cases, we can see why Van Osdol failed where
Bollard prevailed. Van Osdol focused the complaint on her discharge and
sought remedies that threatened to involve the court in ecclesiastical matters.
By contrast, Bollard's legal team carefully avoided framing the issues in terms
that could involve the court in the church's administrative decisions. The accu-
sations made and remedies sought in this case centered on predischarge events
and did not cast aspersion on the church's right to make administrative deci-
sions about its clergy; nor did they drag the state into the religious corpora-
tion's ecclesiastical affairs. After carefully navigating through this
constitutional minefield, the Bollard court felt satisfied that granting jurisdic-
tion to the plaintiff would not deprive the church of the protection afforded by
the § 702 religious employer exemption.
In the course of its deliberations, the court conducted a Sherbert test - a
decision that might seem puzzling after the Supreme Court questioned its valid-
ity outside the unemployment compensation field. Why did the Bollard court
do so? One explanation is that it is hard, if not impossible, to construct the
§ 702 exemption in a manner favorable to the aggrieved ministerial function
employee without recourse to a state interest compelling enough to override the
religious employer's First Amendment rights. But then, the court did not predi-
cate its holding on the outcome of the balancing test. Rather, it found that
adjudicating the case would simply not raise any significant First Amendment
problems. Whatever the reason behind the court's decision to use the Sherbert
test, the results were unusual. It was the first time that a circuit level court
granted a clergy employee jurisdiction under a Title VII claim and turned down
131 Id.
132 Id. at 947.
133 Id. at 948.
134 Id. at 950.
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the ministerial exception defense in an employment relationship involving a
church and its ministerial function employee.
There is one more reason we need to take a closer look at the way the
Bollard court constructed the religious employer exemption. The court opened
a potentially fruitful avenue for legal analysis by focusing on substantive and
procedural entanglement. The novelty of this approach might escape a casual
reading because the argument appears embedded in the familiar context of the
Establishment Clause analysis. Yet, this line of reasoning might help us move
the discussion beyond the Sherbert test and suggest new ways of balancing
state interests and First Amendment rights. The rest of this article examines
this avenue for judicial inquiry within the framework of Case Law Grid
Analysis.
PART 2. CASE LAW GRID, JURIDICAL VARIABLES, AND CASE OUTCOMES
2.1. Database, Key Juridical Variables, and Coding Procedures
A legal inquiry typically begins with a few seminal cases that are com-
monly cited by legal scholars. Additional research is likely to turn up less-
known cases which may add a few wrinkles to the legal analysis. Less com-
monly found in legal research are studies where the researcher identifies and
systematically examines the universe of cases meeting certain criteria.
The present study charts a "case law set" in which Title VII cases and the
ministerial exception defense intersect in the adjudication process. More spe-
cifically, this project attempts to identify all cases that meet the following five
criteria: (1) employees working for religious organizations (2) who file Title
VII civil actions (3) against their religious employers where (4) the employer
claims the § 702 exemption or ministerial exception, and where (5) the court
rules on whether the § 702 exemption or ministerial exception defense is appro-
priate for the case at bar.
As of February 7, 2000, a computer search yielded twenty-eight cases that
met the five criteria defining this case law set, from the 1972 McClure v. Salva-
tion Army to the 1999 Bollard v. California Province of the Society of
Jesus.' 35 It should be stressed that this set does not comprise a completely self-
contained universe. There are kindred cases that did not meet one or more
criteria but that contain similar facts and produce the same line of defense.
Among the excluded cases are claims filed under different federal statutes - the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), and Equal Pay Act (EPA).
The database also excludes cases where the religious employer relied exclu-
sively on Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ) defense under § 703e
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.136 Such cases are included in the database
135 See Table 1 for the complete list of cases. Summaries for each case can be found in
Table 2.
136 Amended in 1991 as 42 U.S.C. §2000e-(2e).
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only when they appear in conjunction with Title VII claims and the ministerial
exception defense. '3 7
Once the relevant cases were identified, they were assembled chronologi-
cally and cross-tabulated against key juridical variables.' 3 8 Of the five pro-
tected categories specified in Title VII, only religion, race, and sex
discrimination charges figure prominently among the cases under review.'
39
Tables 3 and 4 also include information about plaintiffs' employment and "case
outcome," i.e., whether the court granted to the religious employer the § 702
exemption or the ministerial exception.
Table 5 brings together fourteen cases where plain sex discrimination was
alleged. It specifies the charges brought by plaintiffs, remedies sought, the
presence or absence of substantive and procedural entanglement, and case out-
comes. Table 6 lists five cases where plaintiff alleged sexual harassment,
including one important case that is not in the database because the charges
were brought not under Title VII but under a state law similar to a relevant
Title VII claim.' 40 Table 7 delineates the type of First Amendment analysis
deployed by the courts. Table 8 features the Lemon and Sherbert tests under-
taken by the courts. Table 9 distinguishes cases by a substantive and procedu-
ral entanglement analysis, as gleaned from the case record. Table 10 represents
federal employment statutes and the categories of employees they were
designed to protect. Table 11 offers a one page summary that lists key vari-
ables and case outcomes in all twenty-eight cases, with each case identified by
a number.
To facilitate coding, each variable was associated with a "test question"
that permitted the coder to enter a "Yes" or "No" value for a given data unit.
Thus, the "ministerial function" variable has a test question: "Are plaintiffs
137 There is one instructive case where a plaintiff brought a sexual harassment charge
against a religious employer that did not make it into the database because the charges were
filed under state law rather than Title VII (a federal statute). Black v. Snyder, 471 N.W.2d
715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). Although the case does not meet the selection criteria, it is
added to a supplementary grid and discussed at length when the issue of sexual harassment
comes under review. By the same token, the database excludes employment disputes involv-
ing "sexual preference" discrimination. See Madsen v. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160, 1161 (Mass.
1985); Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) No. 762 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1980); Lews ex rel. Murphy v. Buchanan, 21 Fair. Empi. Prac. Cas. (BNA) No.
696 (D. Minn. 1979). Sexual preference discrimination is not covered under Title VII.
Finally, there was a limited number of cases where plaintiff filed an action under Title VII
and defendant invoked the ministerial exception defense, but the courts disposed of the cases
on unrelated grounds. See, e.g., Himaka v. Buddist Churches of Am., 917 F. Supp. 698, 707
(N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[g]iven the lack of evidentiary basis, plaintiff cannot survive summary
adjudication of her hostile environment claim."). See also Russell v. Belmont Coll., 554 F.
Supp. 667, 681 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) ("plaintiff has failed to show essential elements of her
pendant state claims ... [and] establish ... that disputed issues of material fact exist . .
138 See Tables 3 and 4.
139 Discrimination on the basis of "color" appeared once. But since it was listed in the
complaint as "race and/or color," Carter v. Baltimore Annual Conference, 1987 WL 18470,
at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1987), and did not figure as an independent variable in the court's
reasoning, it was not included in the grid. This is also the case with a "national origin"
discrimination claim: it appears once in the data set and does not figure in the court's
holding.
140 Black, 471 N.W.2d at 718.
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duties primarily ministerial in nature?" A dash in a grid cell indicates that the
relevant data is missing and could not be inferred from available information.
In most cases, the answer to the test question is easy to glean or infer from the
facts; in some cases it is clearly missing; and in a few cases, the recorded facts
yield conflicting attributions, which will be highlighted in the following
analysis.
Table 9 is the only table featuring ordinal variables "Risk of Substantive
Entanglement" and "Risk of Procedural Entanglement," each allowing for three
readings - "high," "medium," and "low."' 14
1
2.2. Case Law Dynamics, Time Lines, and Court Systems
Title VII became law in 1964, but the first case satisfying the database
criteria, McClure v. Salvation Army (1),142 did not reach the Court until 1972.
In the eight intervening years, the Supreme Court delivered several important
church autonomy decisions, including Epperson v. Arkansas,14 3 Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,144 Walz v.
Tax Commission, 145 Lemon v. Kurtzman,146 and Wisconsin v. Yoder. 14 7 The
first two cases in the grid, McClure v. Salvation Army (1) and King's Garden,
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (2), continue this ongoing inquiry
into the balance between church autonomy and state regulatory responsibilities.
The 1970s would add only one more case to the grid, Whitney v. Greater New
York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists (3). By contrast, eleven cases were filed
in the 1980s, with fourteen in the 1990s. The historical dynamics indicate an
increased willingness by religious institution employees to seek legal remedies
for employment discrimination.
The twenty-eight case database assembled for this analysis reveals uneven
Title VII activity among circuits. 148 Among the seventeen circuit level cases in
the grid, more than half are from three appellate courts: the Fifth Circuit (1, 5,
6, 27), the D.C. Circuit (2, 12, 23, 26), and the Ninth Circuit (7, 11, 28).
Another six appellate level decisions come from the Fourth (10, 24), Seventh
(13, 21), Eighth (16), and Third (17) Circuits. Only one case, from the Tenth
Circuit, Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos (14), was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court.
141 See infra § 2.6. The present study does not apply statistical analysis to the database
because the grids track a limited number of variables and are fairly easy to scan. But over-
sized case law sets with hundreds of variables would call for sampling techniques and mul-
tivariate analysis.
142 Here and below, the number after each case indicates the case law number in the grid
(see Table 1 for full citation and Table 2 for case summaries).
143 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (warning that democracy must be equally impartial toward religion
or nonreligion).
144 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (calling on civil courts to stay out of church property disputes).
145 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (reminding that the Establishment Clause militates against the state
conferring financial benefits on religion).
146 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (spelling out a three-part test for judging whether neutral
statutes violate the Establishment Clause).
147 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (urging caution in granting religious institutions an exemp-
tion from state regulations).
148 See Table 2 for case summaries.
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The nine district holdings on Title VII claims filed by religious employees
include two cases from the Ninth Circuit (19, 20), two from the Seventh Circuit
(15, 18), and one case each from the First (8), Second (3), Sixth (9), Eighth (4),
and Tenth Circuits (22). Only one case in the grid, Van Osdol v. Vogt (22), was
routed through the state court system.
The uneven distribution of relevant case law among circuits calls for fur-
ther analysis. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 had a particularly strong impact in
the South, where the Fifth Circuit took the lead in clarifying the law. Three out
of four cases that came from this circuit - McClure v. Salvation Army (1),
EEOC v. Mississippi College (5), and EEOC v. Southern Baptist (6) - appeared
early in case law history under review and resulted in key holdings that defined
the law in this important segment of First Amendment jurisprudence. Seven-
teen years passed before the Fifth Circuit reviewed another Title VII claim by a
religious institution employee in Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Sev-
enth-Day Adventists and Gruesebeck (24). One time this appellate court over-
turned the lower court decision (5) and one time reversed and remanded in part
(6). The "ministerial exception" codified by the Fifth Circuit is the most
important contribution this circuit made to the case law. Not surprisingly, each
time a ministerial function employee filed an action under Title VII in this
appellate court system, the Fifth Circuit held for the church.
The D.C. Circuit is also active in the grid. Two decisions by this court
should be noted, King's Garden, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission
(2), which cast doubt on the constitutionality of the § 702 exemption, and
EEOC v. Catholic University of America (23), which upheld the constitutional-
ity of RFRA (later found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court).' 49 Only
once did the D.C. Circuit reverse and remand the lower court decision (2).
When it came to ministerial function employees, the D.C. Circuit followed pre-
cedent and exempted religious employers from Title VII scrutiny.
The Ninth Circuit decisions are consistent; all held for Title VII petitioners
(7, 11, 28). Recently, the Ninth Circuit overturned a lower court decision in
Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus (28), the only circuit
level holding that recognized a ministerial function employee's Title VII claim.
Another influential Ninth Circuit holding is EEOC v. Pacific Publishing Ass'n
(7), which offered a detailed analysis of Title VII claims by religious workers
in light of the Sherbert and Lemon tests and showed where a compelling state
interest may override the church's First Amendment rights.
The Eleventh Circuit contributed no case law to the grid, one possible
explanation being that it followed the trail blazed by its sister circuit, the Fifth.
Two other underrepresented circuits in the grid are the First (8) and the Second
(3). I would hypothesize that this particular underrepresentation may be due to
the fact that plaintiffs residing in this area prefer to file their claims under
comparable state laws in state courts rather than through the federal court
system.
Judging from the grid, the lower courts are more sympathetic to Title VII
petitioners than circuit courts. Six out of nine claims filed in district courts
were decided against employers (3, 4, 15, 18, 20, 25), including two cases with
149 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
[Vol. 2:86
Spring/Summer 2002] MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND TITLE VII CLAIMS 109
ministerial function employees, Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (15) and
Dolter v. Wahlert High School (4), and one case involving a parochial school
principal where the court, going against precedent, classified plaintiff as a non-
religious duty employee, Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc. (18).
Sometimes the circuits issue conflicting rulings, as happened with Vigars
v. Valley Christian Center of Dublin, California (20), where the court explicitly
took issue with a ruling issued by another circuit in a similar case, Little v.
Wuerl (17). 150 More often than not, the discrepancies in the circuit holdings go
unnoticed, and with the Supreme Court remaining silent on certain contentious
issues, the circuits continue to differ on their construction of § 702.
The case law grid analysis also helps us determine the circuits where the
EEOC has been the most aggressive in its push against employment discrimina-
tion.151 The EEOC filed suit in federal court against a religious employer eight
times; five times the courts upheld the Title VII suit brought by the EEOC (5,
6, 7, 9, 11) and three times the decision went against the EEOC (19, 23, 27).
All the decisions supporting EEOC subpoenas took place in the 1980s. The
EEOC filed suit three more times in the 1990s, but lost each case. The EEOC
was most active in the Fifth Circuit, where it sought Title VII jurisdiction on
behalf of employees working for religious organizations, winning once (5), los-
ing once (27), and taking a split decision in the third case (6).152
2.3. Religious Employer, Religious Office, and Religious Job Content
Title VII defined "religion" in the broadest terms as including "all aspects
of religious observance and practice, as well as belief." '153 This tautological
definition did not seem problematic at the time, yet it was soon put to the test,
as courts struggled to clarify who qualified as a religious employer, which
department in a church-run enterprise represented a religious office, and what
job could be considered a bona fide religious activity.
In a couple of cases, defendants sought to evade judicial review with
claims that they were not "employers" within the meaning of the statute. Thus,
in the first case to have ruled on the ministerial exception, McClure v. Salvation
Army (1), the defendant claimed that "it was neither an 'employer' nor a person
150 The court noted that:
[Defendant] rel[ies], almost exclusively, on a recent 3rd Circuit decision, Little v. Wuerl, 929
F.2d 944 (1991), in which the court came to exactly the opposite decision .... This case signals
a developing split in the circuits which the Supreme Court will have to address. However,
because this Circuit finds the 9th Circuit's reasoning far more persuasive, and because the law in
this Circuit is settled on this issue, Little holds little significance for our inquiry.
Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
151 Title VII requires the petitioner to report a grievance to the EEOC, which then reviews
the complaint, determines whether the charge has merit, works with the employer to rectify
the situation, and, if these efforts fail, issues a right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 706b-e. Even
when the EEOC finds the complaint without merit, it is obliged to issue a right to sue letter.
The EEOC is also authorized to bring action on behalf of an employee who files a class
action suit. 42 U.S.C. § 706f.
152 There is one documented case in the grid where the EEOC found a Title VII claim
without merit and still issued plaintiff a right to sue letter, which resulted in a court proceed-
ing that went against the plaintiff. Combs v. Cent. Texan Annual Conference of the United
Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999).
153 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17, § 701(j).
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engaged in an 'industry affecting commerce' within the meaning of §§ 701(b)
and (h) .... 4 The court brushed aside the defendant's argument, pointing
out that with its 3,000 employees, 1,330 officers, "gross annual earnings...
over $7,000,000," and "property holdings worth more than $62,000,000," the
organization comes well within the statute's purview.' 55 The court held that
the institution involved in commerce may not be exempt from the effect of
social legislation simply because it was created for fraternal purposes. 15 6 In
Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc. (18),157 another religious employer
sought to evade Title VII scrutiny by claiming less than twenty five employees,
which would place it outside the statutory definition of "employer." The court
turned down this defense, stating that the matter was in dispute and that it was
up to the jury to decide this issue of fact. 58
In the majority of cases, defendants argued that any employment affiliated
with the church (no matter how tenuous) was exempt from Title VII scrutiny
under the ministerial exception. Yet in only half of the cases represented in the
case law grid did the court accept this argument. Thus, in EEOC v. Mississippi
College (5), the court held:
The College is not a church. The College's faculty and staff do not function as
ministers. The faculty members are not intermediaries between a church and its con-
gregation. . . . The employment relationship between Mississippi College and its
faculty and staff is one intended by Congress to be regulated by Title VIL
159
The only exception the court allowed was in cases where the defendant
demonstrated that the questionable employment practice was grounded in relig-
ious doctrine. 160
The Fifth Circuit issued a similar holding in EEOC v. Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary (6), where it accepted the lower court's distinction
between "three categories of seminary employees: faculty, administrative staff,
and support staff' but vacated the district court judgment that the employment
relationships in the first two categories are shielded from judicial review, find-
ing instead that the § 702 exemption covers only the seminary faculty. 16 1 The
court issued what amounted to a warning to parochial institutions that the "sta-
tus of these employees as ministers for the purpose of McClure remains a legal
conclusion subject to plenary review. . . .While religious organizations may
designate persons as ministers for their religious purposes free from any gov-
ernment interference, bestowal of such a designation does not control their
extra-religious status."' 162
In EEOC v. Pacific Press (7), the Ninth Circuit reinforced this judgment
by denying a religious publishing house a § 702 exemption in a suit brought by
154 460 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1972).
155 Id. at 557.
156 Id.
157 812 F. Supp. 802, 805 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
158 Id.
159 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). The court ordered defendant to comply with the
EEOC subpoena and produce documents needed to investigate whether the College discrimi-
nated on the basis of race and sex.
160 Id.
161 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981).
162 Id.
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an editorial secretary charging that female employees received fewer benefits
than similarly situated males. 163 "Administrative" activities and "discretion-
ary" responsibilities performed by a religious office worker did not automati-
cally certify the job as primarily religious. The court held that because
plaintiffs duties were more similar to those of the staff and faculty than to the
duties of a minister, the publisher was not exempt from Title VII.64
In Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor (8), the court started with the
familiar premise that "not every endeavor that is affiliated ... with a recog-
nized religious body may qualify as a religious activity,"1 65 but nonetheless
held for the employer. Unlike earlier cases where plaintiffs charged discrimi-
natory practice based on factors other than religion, Feldstein contested the
decision by the Christian Science Monitor to deny him a reporting job because
he was not affiliated with the church. "I find the conclusion inescapable,"
wrote the judge, "that the Monitor is itself a religious activity of a religious
organization," and that "it is permissible for the Monitor to apply a test of
religious affiliation to candidates for employment." 166
The same logic, however, failed to carry in Ninth & 0 Street Baptist
Church v. EEOC (9). The court held that the EEOC has the right to conduct an
inquiry into whether an entity's policy is inconsistent with Title VII. Hence,
the employer must furnish the EEOC with all relevant documents.'
67
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos (14) added a substantially new element to the debate about the
religious nature of the office and the religious character of job content when it
held that it would be too onerous a burden to require religious entities to prove
the spiritual significance of their activities. Thus, religious employers should
be given the benefit of the doubt when it comes to defining the nature of their
nonprofit undertakings. The Court observed that its ruling favoring religious
employers did not undermine congressional intent because § 702 "exempted
only the religious activities of such employers from the statutory ban on relig-
ious discrimination." 168 The Amos holding gave religious employers further
incentive to invoke religious infractions as a reason for dismissing nonreligious
function employees.
In several cases (4, 15, 9), the defense uses this strategy by citing plain-
tiffs failure to conform to one or another religious precept and claimant alleg-
ing "pretext" for prohibited discriminatory practices. Thus, in Vigars v. Valley
Christian Center of Dublin, California (20), a pregnant librarian claimed to
have been fired on account of her pregnancy (sex discrimination), while the
defendant maintained that she was fired for adultery (a violation of church doc-
trine).169 Similarly, in Dolter v. Walhert High School (4), a pregnant teacher
blamed her dismissal on sex discrimination and defendant urged that the dis-
163 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982).
164 Id. at 1278.
165 Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 978 (D. Mass. 1983).
166 Id. at 978-79.
167 Ninth & 0 St. Baptist Church v. EEOC, 616 F. Supp. 1231-32 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
168 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987).
169 Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 804 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
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missal was on religious grounds since plaintiff was "intricately involved in its
[school's] religious pedagogical mission" and obligated to follow "a code of
religious moral conduct .,,170 The court found that Dolter had a legitimate
Title VII claim.
Almost one third of all cases represented in the case law grid were filed by
parochial school employees (4, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 24). The defendants pre-
vailed only where they succeeded in implicating religious reasons for the dis-
missal (17, 24) or when the employer was a religious college or university (5,
6, 13, 23). The grid contains three cases where plaintiffs' work was unmistaka-
bly secular. In one instance the court ruled for a plaintiff who charged racism
(3), and in two others for the defense, alleging religious infractions (14, 19).
In the cases discussed above, courts wrestle with two key variables in
reaching their decision: the status of employer and employee and the job func-
tions of the employee. With the passage of time, however, the courts increas-
ingly focus on the employee's job content and functions in determining
whether a plaintiffs claim to protection under Title VII has merit.
2.4. Ministerial Ordination, Ministerial Function, and the "Primary
Duties" Test
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 says nothing about "ministers," a "minister-
church relationship," or "ministerial function." On its face, Title VII was
meant to apply to all employees working for religious institutions; the sole
exception allowed under § 702 was the religious employers' bias toward same-
faith employees. The McClure court (1) singled out the church-minister rela-
tionship as a special bond, the one meriting a blanket exemption from Title VII
scrutiny, when it formulated and applied the ministerial exception to a civil
action brought by an ordained minister. 7 ' Five more times after McClure an
ordained minister initiated a Title VII action (12, 16, 21, 22, 26) and lost in
every case.
Although in its original form the ministerial exception applied to ordained
clergy exclusively, it was soon extended to non-ordained employees working
for religious organizations. EEOC v. Mississippi College (5) paved the way for
this expansion by determining that workers must serve as "intermediaries
between a church and its congregation" before their ministerial status is estab-
lished and their Title VII claims are exempted from judicial review.' 72 In
EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist (6), the Fifth Circuit further clarified the issue
when it distinguished the question of who performs "a ministerial function"
from that of who are "'ministers in the formal sense."' ' 7 3 It was Rayburn v.
General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists (10), however, that codified the
principle when it held that the "'ministerial exception' to Title VII first articu-
lated in McClure v. Salvation Army ... does not depend upon ordination but
upon the function of the position."'174 Seventh-Day Adventists are a church
170 Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
"I' McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
172 EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980).
173 EEOC v. S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 1981).
174 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168-69 (4th
Cir. 1985).
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where "women may not stand for ordination," but the job Ms. Rayburn held in
her church was nevertheless ministerial in function. 75
This progressive problematization of the worker's duties has raised the
possibility that ordained ministers serving in a nonministerial capacity could
find access to the courts with their employment discrimination claims. 176 The
database does not support this supposition. In Carter v. Baltimore Annual Con-
ference (12), an African-American minister serving "under the administrative
arm of the church in a non-religious capacity"17 7 tried to convince the court
that the congressional intent behind Title VII was to protect employees like
himself from race-based discrimination, but failed: "As strong and compelling
as this interest is," the court concluded,
it does not override the church's interest in an employment relationship with its min-
ister which is free from interference and review. Regardless of the capacity in which
a minister fulfills his duties, the minister serves as a church's lifeblood because the
minister acts as the chief instrument through which the church performs its
purposes.
178
We cannot generalize from this case, for it is the only one of its kind in the
grid. Still, it casts doubt on the premise that "function" rather than "ordination"
drives the court's decision on the ministerial exception.
As one can glean from Table 3, nonordained employees performing minis-
terial functions faired better with their Title VII claims than ordained employ-
ees. On three different occasions, in Dolter (4), Nigrelli (15), and Bollard (28),
the court found that such employees were entitled to judicial review under this
statute. But that is three out of fifteen cases where plaintiffs with a court
authenticated ministerial function won the right to air their grievances in a court
of law. Even this ratio does not paint the full picture, for it obscures the prob-
lematic nature of the act through which the judiciary assigns plaintiffs a minis-
terial function status.
Take Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc. (18), for example. Here, the
principal in a synagogue-affiliated school filed action against her employer
alleging sex and national origin discrimination after the congregation refused to
renew her employment contract following her complaint about her retirement
account. 17 9 The defendant raised a host of objections, ranging from not quali-
fying as an employer, "[u]ntimeliness of [c]harge," and "failure to state a cause
of action" to "lack of subject matter jurisdiction"' 80 and the infringement of its
"First Amendment [rights]."' 8 ' Unimpressed by defendant's arguments, the
court denied its motion to dismiss on every ground, including defendant's con-
175 Id. at 1168.
176 In EEOC v. S.W. Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284, the defendant cited four relevant cases
involving ordained minsters working in nonministerial capacities. "Unlike Officer
McClure," the court observed, "these workers' ordination is not an integral part of their total
vocation. These support personnel are not engaged in activities traditionally considered
ecclesiastical or religious." Id.
177 Carter v. Baltimore Annual Conference, No. 86-2543 SSH, 1987 WL 18470, at *1
(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1987).
178 Id.
179 Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802, 804 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
180 Id. at 803-04.
181 Id. at 807.
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tention that "any attempt.., to 'restrain a synagogue's free choice of its relig-
ious education personnel would constitute an infringement on the synagogue's
free exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.' ' 1 8 2 The court
declined to classify plaintiff as a ministerial function employee, pointing out
that in contrast to the present case, "Rayburn ...involved an applicant in a
pastoral position." '83
This ruling came on the heels of another holding from the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, in Nigreli v. Catholic of Chicago (15) where the court denied
the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the termination of a Catholic
school principal may have been a pretext for sex discrimination, alleging sexual
harassment and wrongful constructive discharge.
If a religious school principal can be a nonministerial employee, you
might think this must be a fortiori true about religious school teachers.
Throughout the circuits, however, judges have classified school teachers as pas-
toral workers. The Dolter (4) court saw no reason to question the church's
position that plaintiff, a Catholic lay teacher of English, was involved in the
pedagogical ministry.1 84 Another judgment went against an elementary school
teacher in Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists (24),
when the court disclaimed jurisdiction in plaintiffs race discrimination charge,
agreeing with the defendant that all its teachers engage in spiritual work since
their schools "have an express and avowedly sectarian purpose ... [to secure]
the salvation of each student's soul through his or her indoctrination in Sev-
enth-day Adventist theological beliefs." '85 A similar disposition was reached
in EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, North Carolina (25), where a
music minister claiming to have been unfairly demoted to a part-time school
teacher maintained that her prior job at the cathedral was ministerial, but her
role as a teacher in the school was not.186 The court held that the "music pro-
gram at the school encompasses school liturgies, prayer services and the school
choirs" and is thus a pastoral undertaking.1 87
The courts have tried different strategies in formulating and applying "the
primary duties test."1 88 The Mississippi College court did not see fit to call
employees "ministerial" unless they serve as "intermediaries between a church
and its congregation," "attend to the religious needs of the faithful," or "instruct
students in the whole of religious doctrine."' 8 9 The Fifth Circuit added a new
twist to the test in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary (6) by
pointing out that seminary teachers are ministerial when the "faculty models
the ministerial role for the students."19 The Rayburn (10) court determined
that "[a]s a general rule, if the employee's primary duties consist of teaching,
spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship, he or she should be
182 Id.
183 Id. at 807-08.
184 Dolter v. Wahler High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
185 1998 WL 904528, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998).
186 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
187 Id.
188 Clapper, 1998 WL 904528, at *6 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998).
189 EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980).
190 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981).
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considered 'clergy.""'1 9 The Little (17) court followed these guidelines in
determining a parochial school teacher's ministerial status, quoting in particular
the Parish school manual that the "integration of religious truth and values with
the rest of life is brought about in the Catholic school ....""
In EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, North Carolina (27), the
court ascertained plaintiff s "primary duties" using a rationale laid out in schol-
arly articles by Sidney Buchanan who emphasized "inner core activities of a
religious organization"' 193 and by Bruce N. Bagni who focused on the "core
religious beliefs framework." '19 4 This approach envisions that the religious
function employee's "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or participa-
tion in religious ritual and worship."' 95 Buchanan adds that the "activities
[must be] tied uniquely to the teachings, doctrine, and worship forms of a relig-
ious entity" before they pass the test as belonging to the religious entity's
"inner core."' 9 6 The point here is that genuinely ministerial functions "have no
significant parallel in the secular world," while nonminsterial functions do.' 97
Applying these guidelines to specific cases has not yielded consistent
results. Thus, Mr. Clapper, an elementary school teacher, reckoned that "the
time he spent instructing his students in the Bible and leading them in worship
constituted only 10.6 percent of his work week" and that "of the thirteen gen-
eral responsibilities of full-time elementary school teachers in the Education
Code, only one is explicitly religious, none are sacerdotal and none involve
church governance."1 98 The court paid no heed to his argument, finding him a
ministerial function employee whose "primary duties ... [are] teaching and
spreading the Seventh-day Adventist faith. . . ."" Similarly, in EEOC v.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, North Carolina (27), the court zeroed in
on "the purely religious role of music within the Catholic church" when apply-
ing the primary duties test to a music teacher in a parochial school. 2" But, as
we saw earlier, the primary duties test yielded opposite results when the Elbaz
(18) court applied it to a school principal and the Vigars (20) court applied the
test to a parochial school teacher. Both plaintiffs were assigned a nonminis-
terial status by the courts.
The situation is further complicated by the premise that religious employ-
ees must embody church doctrine not only in their beliefs and affiliations, but
also in their everyday conduct. The case in point is when the Little (17) court
19' Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir.
1985).
192 Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 948 n.5 (3rd Cir. 1991).
193 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 515 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (citing G.
Sidney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class Discrimination by Religious
Entities: A Study in Conflicting Values, 43 EMORY L.J. 1189, 1207-15 (1994)).
194 Id. (citing Bagni, supra note 23).
195 Bagni, supra note 23, at 1545.
196 Buchanan, supra note 23, at 1210 (emphasis added).
197 Id.
198 Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 166 F.3d 1208 (Table),
1998 WL 904528, at *6 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998).
199 Id. at *7.
200 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 48 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
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granted a motion to dismiss to the church that fired a religious school teacher
who failed to pursue a proper annulment procedure. The court cited as a justifi-
cation for its decision NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, where the Supreme
Court pointedly noted that "[i]n recent decisions involving aid to parochial
schools we have recognized the critical and unique role of the teacher in fulfil-
ling the mission of the church-operated school."2 °1 In its holding, the district
court determined that "the permission to employ persons 'of a particular relig-
ion' includes permission to employ only persons whose beliefs and conduct are
consistent with the employer's religious precepts. '"202
Similarly, the Van Osdol (22) court disclaimed jurisdiction in a sexual
harassment suit after concluding that a minister is "the embodiment of the
churches religious beliefs" and that only the church can determine whether "a
particular person embodies or does not embody the religious beliefs of the
church."2 o3
The parochial school administrators tried the same logic in Vigars v. Val-
ley Christian Center of Dublin, California (20), arguing that a librarian who
became pregnant while in transition between two marriages violated a signed
agreement in which she pledged "that she and her children would be bound by
the moral values, codes, doctrines and beliefs of the church." 2" But the Vigars
court was not swayed by this fact, holding that legitimate doubts remain as to
whether the decision to fire plaintiff was driven by religious considerations and
that the church would have to prove in court whether its representatives fired
plaintiff because she committed adultery or because she became pregnant
outside marriage.20 5
The question these cases raise is where do employers - or the courts -
draw the line between ecclesiastically significant public behavior and constitu-
tionally protected private conduct. The extent to which a pastoral employee
must model the church doctrine is open to divergent interpretations. All in all,
the question remains unsettled as to whether plaintiffs job must be purely
ecclesiastical, primarily religious, or simply involve some sectarian functions
for the worker to qualify as a ministerial function employee. As such, no party
in Title VII litigation can be certain about the outcome of the "primary duties"
test. The Case Law Grid attests to this conclusion.
Thus, among the fifteen cases in the database where plaintiffs position
was deemed to be ministerial, we find five ordained ministers (1, 4, 16, 21, 26),
three college or university instructors (13, 23, 27), four school teachers (4, 10,
17, 24), one religious school principal (15), one reporter for a religious publica-
tion (8), and one novitiate in a seminary (28). By contrast, among the eleven
cases where the courts did not confirm plaintiff's ministerial status are four
201 Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 948 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979)). The Little court also quoted approvingly Senator
Erwin's justification for his 1972 amendment to § 702: "I would allow the religious corpo-
ration to do what it pleases. That is what my amendment would allow it to do. It would
allow it liberty. It would take it out from under the control of the EEOC entirely." Id. at 950
(quoting 118 CONG. REc. 1982 (1972)).
202 Id. at 951.
203 Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1128 (Colo. 1966).
204 Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 804 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
205 Id. at 810.
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receptionists-secretaries (3, 7, 19, 25), two college instructors (5, 13), one
school principal (18), one school librarian (20), one religious school employee
(11), one radio station employee (2), and one assistant building engineer (14).
In two more cases the relevant data about plaintiffs are missing: one involves
an employee at a sectarian child development center (9) and another covers
employees in a denominational college where no plaintiff initiated a suit (6). If
there is a common logic behind these adjudications of ministerial function, it
escapes an easy grasp.
All parties involved in Title VII litigation face considerable uncertainty in
the high stakes game of defining primary duties. Thus, religious employers
may find themselves in the awkward position of trying to convince the courts
that a job applicant opposed to the Catholic Church's views on abortion is not
well suited for a theology professorship at a Catholic university, or that an
unmarried pregnant teacher does not help promulgate the church doctrine of
chastity and marital fidelity. The religious employer's position in some of
these cases is open to criticism, but this does not obviate the predicament relig-
ious organizations face trying to fathom how the courts might rule on an
employee's ministerial function.
The situation is still more debilitating for religious function employees
consigned to a discrimination category called "clergy." Once plaintiffs are
classified as ministerial function workers, they become de facto, if not de jure,
"at will" category employees. The clergy's privacy is bound to be invaded
under these circumstances because the legal process gives employers an incen-
tive to expand the range of behavior imbued with ecclesiastical significance
and to increase the store of doctrinal infractions which can be invoked to justify
discriminatory employment practices. Whenever the church cites a religious
infraction, the court is likely to be blindsided and take the charge for granted.
This is what the ministerial exception demands, for as the Rayburn (10) court
observed in its sober dicta, the ministerial exception "protects the act of a deci-
sion rather than a motivation behind it."20 6
2.5. Charges, Remedies, and Title VII Claims
Tables 3 through 6 correlate plaintiffs' grievances, ministerial status, dem-
ographic characteristics, and case outcomes. The grid also helps track the Title
VII claim dynamics over time, specific charges brought, and remedies sought
by religious institutions' employees. By far the most common claim in the grid
is plain sex discrimination - it was raised fourteen times (1, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 13,
16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 26, 27). The other two common claims are religion-based
discrimination - which occurred six times (2, 8, 9, 14, 17, 19), and race dis-
crimination complaints which appeared in the grid six times (3, 5, 10, 12, 21,
24). Four times plaintiffs charged sexual harassment (15, 22, 25, 28), once
national origin discrimination (18), and once color discrimination (12). In five
cases, plaintiff brought two Title VII discrimination claims: race and sex (5,
10, 7), race and color (12), and sex and national origin (18). In several cases, a
Title VII grievance has been accompanied by another federal statutory claim:
206 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir.
1985).
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (16, 23, 24), Pregnancy Discrimi-
nation Act (20, 26), Fair Labor Standards Act (18), and Equal Pay Act (11).207
Fifteen times the courts exempted defendants from Title VII scrutiny (1, 8, 10,
12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27); twelve times accepted jurisdiction
over Title VII claims (2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 15, 18, 20, 25, 28); among these
twelve cases were three ministerial function employees (4, 15, 28), and in one
case that featured no individual claimant (6) the court made a split decision.
Most Title VII claims against religious organizations - twenty-one out of
twenty-seven - were brought by women,208 and all fourteen plain sex discrimi-
nation complaints were initiated by female plaintiffs. 20 9 Three out of four sex-
ual harassment charges were also filed by women. 2 10 Men claimed religion-
based discrimination claims three times (2, 8, 14), race discrimination twice
(12, 24), and sexual harassment once (28).
The divergent time lines for Title VII claims also reveal certain historical
patterns. While plain sex discrimination charges are distributed evenly
throughout the examined period, most of the race discrimination charges (3, 5,
10, 12) were filed between 1975 and 1987, with the other two filed in 1994 (21)
and 1998 (24). This may be a sign that race discrimination in religious institu-
tions is now less prevalent than sex-based discrimination, the conclusion born
out by the fact that women, who comprise over half of the U.S. population,
account for 11.7 percent of the nation's clergy, compared with 11.2 percent of
the nation's clergy who are black - the number roughly equal to the percentage
of the black population in the U.S.2 '
Religion-based discrimination claims follow a similar trajectory, with four
suits brought between 1975 and 1987 (2, 8, 9, 14) and two more between 1988
and 1999 (17, 19). This drop reflects the Court's holding in Amos (14), which
expanded the scope of § 702 by granting religious employers broad rights to
favor coreligionists in employment, making it more difficult to bring religion-
based discrimination claims against religious employers. Indeed, after Amos,
no petitioner succeeded in having the court recognize a religion-based discrimi-
nation claim, whereas two times in the earlier period the claimants won juris-
diction (2, 9).
By contrast, all four sexual harassment claims (15, 22, 25, 28) were filed
in the 1990s, starting with the 1991 Nigrelli case. This can be explained by the
fact that the 1991 Civil Rights Act added new language to the statute prohibit-
ing "unlawful harassment in the workplace., 21 2 The trend should also be
assessed against the backdrop of the general rise in the nation's sexual harass-
ment litigation following two Supreme Court holdings in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson2 3 and Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. 2 14
207 In several cases, employers mounted a BFOQ defense alongside the familiar ministerial
exception defense (2, 11, 13, 18, 20), and the courts turned it down each time, disposing of
the cases on unrelated grounds.
208 See Tables 3-4.
209 See Table 5.
210 See Table 6.
211 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES.
212 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
213 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
214 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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Race Discrimination
One claim was filed by a white plaintiff alleging discrimination against
whites (24). Five other race discrimination claims involved individuals charg-
ing the employer with anti-black bias (3, 5, 10, 12, 21), three of them brought
by white individuals (3, 5, 10). In Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Sev-
enth-Day Adventists (3), a white typist-receptionist alleged that her church fired
her "solely because she was maintaining a casual social relationship with one
Samuel Johnson, a black man."'21 5 The court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss, holding that the alleged discrimination was not based on any religious
doctrine and thus did not exempt the employer from Title VII scrutiny.21 6
In EEOC v. Mississippi College, Mrs. Summers, a white part-time psy-
chology instructor at a denominational college, charged that her employer
showed a pattern of discrimination in recruitment practices.2 17 On the § 702
defense asserted by the college, the court ruled that the relationship between a
college instructor teaching a nonreligious subject and a religious employer was
not purely religious, as required for the McClure exception, and was therefore
not immune from Title VII scrutiny.
Another white plaintiff, Carole Rayburn, an associate pastor at the Sev-
enth-Day Adventist Church, charged discrimination stemming from her associ-
ation with blacks; her affiliation with black-oriented religious organizations.21 8
This time the court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the case because
plaintiffs job, in addition to her Sunday school teaching responsibilities,
involved conducting classes, ministering to the singles group, and preaching at
various churches.2 1 9
Two race discrimination suits were brought by blacks, with both plaintiffs
losing their cases. In Carter v. Baltimore Annual Conference (12), an ordained
minister serving in a church's financial office brought action charging "race
and/or color" discrimination, but the court declined to exercise jurisdiction,
holding that the church-minister relationship is protected by the First Amend-
ment "[r]egardless of the capacity in which a minister fulfills his duties. 22 ° In
Young v. Northern Illinois Conference of United Methodist Church (21), a
black female serving as "a probationary minister of the United Methodist
Church" brought a race discrimination action after she was passed up for pro-
motion, charging that her church "did not follow the procedure it has previ-
ously 'always' followed in such cases. '"221 The court granted defendant a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on First Amendment
grounds, pointing out that "religious bodies may make apparently arbitrary
decisions affecting the employment status of their clergy members and be free
from civil review having done SO."
2 2 2
215 401 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
216 Id.
217 626 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1980).
218 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1165 (4th Cir.
1985).
219 Id.
220 1987 WL 18470, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1987).
221 21 F.3d 184, 184-85 (7th Cir. 1994).
222 Id. at 1 R7
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One more plaintiff came forward with a race discrimination claim - ele-
mentary school teacher, Donald Clapper - who alleged, inter alia, "discrimina-
tory discharge... on account of his... race (Caucasian). '223 Plaintiff sought
reinstatement as a remedy. The Fourth Circuit held that Clapper's action was
"barred by the First Amendment's Free Exercise of Religion Clause ".... 224
In sum, two out of six race discrimination Title VII claims were accepted
by the courts, both filed by whites, and both involving nonministerial employ-
ees. Not once did a ministerial function employee filing a race discrimination
claim win a jurisdiction decision. Two times when plaintiffs charging race dis-
crimination sought reinstatement, the defendants received an exemption from
Title VII scrutiny.
Religion-Based Discrimination
Six times plaintiffs charged their employers with religion-based discrimi-
nation, winning two cases (2, 9) and losing four (14, 17, 19, 8). In King's
Garden Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission (2),225 a job applicant
beset by questions about his religious beliefs filed suit under Title VII. The
court refused to grant defendant a § 702 exemption because "[a] religious sect
has no constitutional right to convert a licensed communications franchise into
a church."
226
This holding runs contrary to Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor (8)
where a plaintiff, who was denied a reporting job at a church affiliated publica-
tion, failed to convince the court to accept his Title VII claim. Having sided
with the defense that "the Monitor was a religious organization entitled to favor
coreligionists in its employment practices, 2 27 the court saw no constitutional
impropriety in the Monitor's job application form which explicitly stated that
the "First Church of Christ, Scientist, may by law apply the test of religious
qualifications to its employment policies. ' 22 8
The second and last time the court accepted a religious discrimination
claim was in 1985, in Ninth & 0 Street Baptist Church v. EEOC (9), an
employee at a sectarian child development center was dismissed after she failed
to join the church with which her center was affiliated and inquired about her
rights with the EEOC.22 9 Without initiating an inquiry into plaintiffs ministe-
rial status, the district court ordered the defendant to comply with the EEOC
subpoena.23 °
Two years later, the Supreme Court issued its Amos (14) decision,
affirming the legitimacy of the broad reading of § 702. It is not altogether clear
whether Amos overturned King's Garden (2) and Ninth & 0 (9), since the fact
pattern in the latter case can be distinguished from Amos, but two other cases in
223 Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 166 F.3d 1208 (Table),
1998 WL 904528, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998).
224 Id.
225 498 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
226 Id. at 60.
227 555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983).
228 Id. at 975.
229 616 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (W.D. Ky. 1985) ("other employees who had not contacted the
EEOC were not discharged.").
230 Id. at 1234.
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the grid featuring a failed religion-based discrimination claim followed the
Amos logic. In Little v. Wuerl (17), a sectarian school teacher could not win
jurisdiction on her Title VII claim after she failed to obtain an annulment
before her remarriage."' The court did not directly cite Amos, but based its
decision on a First Amendment argument, even though the facts were similar in
both cases, involving lapsed church membership.
And finally, in EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. (19),232 the court
held that a Christian church-run retirement home could keep a Muslim recep-
tionist from wearing her religious head covering.2 33 After the 1987 Amos deci-
sion, no religion-based discrimination claim by a person working in a religious
organization has been accepted for judicial review under Title VII.
Plain Sex Discrimination
Fourteen plain sex discrimination claims were brought by individuals
working in religious organizations, yielding six decisions favoring plaintiffs,
only one of them recognized by the courts as a ministerial function employee.
Nine employees charging plain sex discrimination asked to be reinstated, but
their Title VII claims were accepted in only two cases, Dolter (4) and Ninth &
O (9). The connection between case outcome and a church's policy on female
ordination turns out to be somewhat counterintuitive. Among six religious
employers known to allow women ordination, five lost their motions to dismiss
(1, 13, 16, 21, 26), and only three out of six employers whose denominations
ordained women won their cases (4, 5, 11). It is also noteworthy that among
six ordained ministers in the grid, five are women (1, 16, 21, 22, 26), with four
female ministers bringing their civil actions between 1991 and 1999. We may
be witnessing a trend that encourages female church officers to step forward
with their Title VII claims.
McClure (1) established precedent when it dismissed Billie McClure's
claim for lack of jurisdiction based on § 702, irrespective of the sex discrimina-
tion evidenced by the smaller salaries accorded to the female officers.234 In six
more cases when petitioners failed to win jurisdiction on a plain sex discrimina-
tion claim (13, 16, 21, 23, 26, 27), the courts determined that plaintiffs were
ministerial function employees and that prosecuting the claim would infringe
on the church's right to administer its affairs without state interference. In five
of these losing claims, plaintiffs sought reinstatement (13, 16, 21, 23, 27).235
The courts' rationales for dismissing these claims were anchored in the First
Amendment. The Seventh Circuit noted the Constitution "forbids a review of a
church's procedures when it makes employment decisions affecting its
clergy ' 236 and guarantees the religious institution's right "to pursue its own
231 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991).
232 EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1992).
233 Id. at 1156 ("It is PMI's right and prerogative to determine how its mission at Exeter
House is to be carried out though there may be employed persons whose jobs may be consid-
ered by some to be secular.").
234 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
235 The relevant information about the other case in this category (26) is not available.
236 Young v. N. I11. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir.
1994).
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path without concession to the views of a federal agency' 237 and without an
invasive "inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-
administrators.
23 8
Five times the courts agreed to review plain sex discrimination in cases
involving nonministerial function employees. In EEOC v. Mississippi College
(5), the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court's decision to grant
the employer a § 702 exemption from scrutiny of a sex discrimination charge
with the following rationale:
If the district court determines on remand that the College applied its policy of pre-
ferring Baptists over non-Baptists in granting the faculty position to Bailey rather
than Summers, then § 702 exempts that decision from the application of Title
VII .... On the other hand, should the evidence disclose only that the College's
preference policy could have been applied, but in fact it was not considered ... in
determining which applicant to hire, § 702 does not bar the EEOC's investigation of
Summers' individual sex discrimination claim.
239
In EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n (7), an editorial secretary pre-
vailed in her claim stemming from her employer's policy of paying higher ben-
efits to "married men [whom the church considered to be heads of households]"
than to "female employees regardless of their marital status."'240 The court
pointed out that Mrs. Tobler was a church member in good standing, that she
did not occupy a "critically sensitive position within the church that McClure
sought to protect, ' 24 1 and that "Congress' purpose to end discrimination is
equally if not more compelling than other interests that ... burdened the exer-
cise of religious convictions. '"242
The Ninth Circuit arrived at a similar judgment in EEOC v. Fremont
Christian School.2 43 Here, a married female school employee filed a complaint
with the EEOC contesting Fremont School's policy of offering health insurance
coverage only to employees who were the male heads of households. The
school defended itself on the First Amendment grounds 2"4 but the appellate
court held for plaintiff because the latter's job did not entail ecclesiastical
functions.24 5
The Elbaz (18) court turned down a congregation's motion to dismiss a
sex discrimination claim by a school principal who claimed her dismissal was
in "retaliation for her retirement plan complaint. '246 The court stated that "it is
a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(3a) to fire an employee because he opposed
237 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir.
1985).
238 Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991)
(quoting NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979)).
239 EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 485-86 (5th Cir. 1980).
240 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1275 (9th Cir. 1982).
241 Id. at 1278.
242 Id. at 1280.
243 EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986).
244 Id. at 1365.
245 Id. at 1369.
246 Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc., 812 F. Supp. 802, 804 (N.D. I11. 1992).
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discrimination against a fellow employee, even if he was mistaken and there
was no discrimination.
247
In Vigars v. Valley Christian Center of Dublin, California (20), a pregnant
employee fired by a parochial school won jurisdiction in a sex discrimination
claim after the court determined that the school manual requiring its teachers to
be role models did not apply to the position of librarian.24 8 The court left it to
the lower court to decide whether the employer was punishing plaintiff because
of her "pregnancy" or because of her "adultery. 2 49
And finally, there is Dolter v. Wahlert High School (4), a case with a
similar fact pattern, involving a pregnant teacher who convinced the court to
accept her sex-bias charge for adjudication.' The case is notable for the logic
the court used to construct the case in a manner that did not threaten the
church's First Amendment rights. The court refused to grant summary judg-
ment, holding that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the sectarian
school was applying its ban on premarital sex equally to male and female
employees.
Sexual Harassment
The database contains four cases featuring sexual harassment charges filed
by religious institutions' employees - Nigrelli (15), Van Osdol (22), Smith
(25), and Bollard (28). All but one, Van Osdol, resulted in a decision favorable
to plaintiffs. Table 6 also includes a pioneering case cited by most other peti-
tioners in this claim category, Black v. Snyder,2 5 1 which upheld a ministerial
function employee's right to bring a Title VII sexual harassment claim. With
four out of five court decisions favoring plaintiffs, sexual harassment is clearly
the claim category where religious institutions' employees have the best chance
to uphold their rights under Title VII.
All five cases have remarkably similar facts. All plaintiffs alleged hostile
work environments related to sexual misconduct by superiors, charged wrong-
ful constructive discharge and retaliation, asked for punitive damages, and
sought class action remedies. Four out of five cases involved ministerial func-
tion employees, the one exception being Smith. In three out of four cases
where information is available, plaintiffs did not seek reinstatement. Judging
from the grid, the only difference between the four plaintiffs winning jurisdic-
tion and the one who lost was the reinstatement sought by the plaintiff in Van
Osdol.
In Nigrelli, a school principal at St. Mary Star of the Sea Parish School
alleged a wrongful termination following quid pro quo sexual harassment by
247 Id. at 806 (quoting Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1182 (7th Cir.
1982)).
248 805 F. Supp. 802, 804 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
249 Id. at 810.
250 483 F. Supp. 266, 270 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
251 471 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The suit was brought under Minnesota state
laws rather than under Title VII, a federal statute, and thus was excluded from the main grid.
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her supervisor.25 2 Similarly, in Black v. Snyder, an associate pastor at a
Lutheran Church alleged that her supervisor made unwelcome sexual advances
toward her and, in spite of her objections, repeatedly touched her in a sexual
manner. 2 The Court of Appeals of Minnesota dismissed plaintiffs breach of
contract, retaliation, and statutory "whistle blower" claims but upheld plain-
tiffs claim for sexual harassment, noting that because "she does not seek rein-
statement but only monetary damages, any prospective remedy would not
require extensive court oversight.
254
In Van Osdol, Justice Mullarkey noted in a concurring opinion that plain-
tiff "may have a claim under the rationale of Black v. Snyder,"25 5 even though
he agreed with the majority that the First Amendment "precludes our jurisdic-
tion over Van Osdol's Title VII and intentional torts claims. '2 56 What landed
plaintiff on the losing side in this case was the fact that she focused her com-
plaint on the discharge itself - a protected decision fully within the church's
prerogative - rather than on the defendant's tortious conduct which enjoys no
constitutional or statutory protection.
In Smith (25), the court confronted a less controversial case where two
nonministerial workers charged their supervisor with assault and battery. 7
Citing Black as precedent, the court distinguished the case at bar from Van
Osdol's facts and accepted plaintiffs cause of action.2 5 ' After an extensive
First Amendment analysis, the Smith court held that "the primary effect of this
court's exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiffs' hostile environment claims will
not inhibit religion and that jurisdiction in this matter is not barred by the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. '25 9
252 Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop, No. 84C-5564, 1991 WL 36712, at *1 (N.D. Ill. March 15,
1991). In holding for the plaintiff the court insisted that the defense could not hide behind
the First Amendment to avoid Title VII liability:
[I]t is undisputed that Ms. Nigrelli was the principal of a Catholic school. However, plaintiff is
not being terminated because of her failure to fulfill her duties as a Catholic teacher .... Liabil-
ity for a possible Title VH violation cannot be avoided by using the First Amendment .... There
is also no doubt that in order to determine if the plaintiff was sexually harassed, the court need
not inquire into the doctrines and religious goals of the Catholic Church nor of the school.
Id. at *4.
253 Black, 471 N.W.2d at 717-18.
254 Id. at 720-21. The Black court invoked the 1990 Supreme Court judgment that "an
individual's religious beliefs may not excuse compliance with an otherwise valid law prohib-
iting conduct that the state is free to regulate." Id. at 719 (paraphrasing Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
255 Van Osdol v. Vogt, 908 P.2d 1122, 1135 (Colo. 1996).
256 Id. at 1125. The majority agreed with Justice Mullarkey that "if Van Osdol had brought
a claim regarding a hostile work environment instead of claims directly related to the
church's decision not to hire her, such a claim might have survived a First Amendment bar."
Id. at 1129 n.l1.
257 Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F.
Supp. 2d 694, 696 (E.D.N.C. 1999). The court did state that one of the two plaintiffs work-
ing as a personal secretary to a minister presented a "hybrid situation" so far as her ministe-
rial status was concerned, id. at 706, but this opinion appears to be at odds with most of the
precedents. The court took note of Meritor Savings Bank FSB v. Vinson, where the Supreme
Court confirmed that "[c]laims of hostile environment sexual harassment constitute a form of
sex discrimination under Title VII." Id. at 701 (citing 477 U.S. 57 (1986)).
258 Smith, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 712.
259 Id. at 719.
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And finally, John Bollard managed to convince the Ninth Circuit that his
sexual harassment action could be adjudicated without dwelling on doctrinal
matters or undermining the church's First Amendment rights. 2 6 0 The Bollard
court broke new ground in more than one area, starting with the fact that it is
the first federal appellate court to accept a Title VII claim by a ministerial
function employee. The Bollard court turned down the employer's Religion
Clause defense, arguing that "the Jesuits most certainly do not claim that
allowing harassment to continue unrectified is a method of choosing their
clergy, ' 261 and that the court faces a "restricted inquiry," a doctrine-neutral trial
that "will require a jury to ... make secular judgments about the nature and
severity of the harassment and what measures, if any, were taken by the Jesuits
to prevent or correct it."'262 The Bollard court reversed the lower court deci-
sion not only on substantive but also on jurisdictional grounds, holding, against
precedent, that the district court ruling on subject matter jurisdiction was proce-
durally unsound:
Upon finding that the ministerial exception applies to Bollard's claim under Title
VII, the district court dismissed his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) for want of subject matter jurisdiction. We reverse that dismissal, but we
also wish to make clear that, had Bollard's claim indeed been barred, it should have
been dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) .... As the Supreme Court wrote in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 90
L.Ed 939, 66 S.Ct. 773 (1946), "Jurisdiction is not defeated.., by the possibility that
the averments might fail to state the cause of action on which petitioner could actu-
ally recover. . . . If the Court . . . exercises its jurisdiction to determine that the
allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case
would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction." 263
The Bollard decision might seem puzzling if we take "subject matter juris-
diction" to mean "the extent to which a court can claim to affect the conduct of
persons or the status of things. '26 When the court dismisses a Title VII federal
action on account of § 702 or the ministerial exception, it acknowledges pre-
cisely that it is precluded by law from intervening in the dispute and compel-
ling the parties to comply with its orders. But the Bollard court's reasoning
that the district court decision to dismiss should have been for failure to state a
claim rather than for want of subject matter jurisdiction has merit. If nothing
else, it renders explicit that Title VII claimants - even if statutory or constitu-
tional reasons bar the court from reviewing the merit of their action and offer-
ing relief - have brought non-frivolous complaints that seek to vindicate a
compelling state interest.
In summary, sexual harassment claims by religious employees stand the
best chance of all Title VII claims to be accepted by the courts as valid Title
VII actions. Three out of four such claims in the main grid have been granted
judicial review, compared to two out of six race discrimination claims, two out
of six religion-based discrimination claims, and six out of fourteen plain sex
260 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F. 3d 940, 944-50 (9th Cir. 1999).
261 Id. at 947.
262 Id. at 950.
263 Id. at 950-51.
264 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).
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discrimination claims. Moreover, two out of three cases in the database where
the courts allowed a Title VII suit by a ministerial function employee to go
forward were in this claim category. What is critical here is that a civil action
alleging hostile work environment has a chance to succeed as long as plaintiffs
do not contest the church's right to hire and fire ministerial workers and focus
instead on the pre-discharge conditions injurious to plaintiffs well-being and
inconsistent with the religious institution's own policies. The Black and Bol-
lard holdings can be seen as carving an "exception to the ministerial excep-
tion," insofar as these decisions point the way to a doctrine-neutral and
entanglement-free adjudication of Title VII actions brought by the clergy.
The final section focuses on First Amendment issues and raises the ques-
tion of whether the Black and Bollard logic can be generalized and extended to
other Title VII claim categories brought by ministerial workers.
2.6. Free Exercise Clause, Establishment Clause, and the Forms of
Entanglement
The case law grid shows what kind of First Amendment analysis the
courts have undertaken in the course of their deliberation on Title VII
claims.265 In twenty-four cases the courts made Free Exercise Clause and
Entanglement Clause analyses. In three instances, the Entanglement Clause
analysis is missing (3, 13, 15), two times the courts skipped the Free Exercise
analysis (13, 16), and in one case, the court did not touch upon either of the
First Amendment Religion Clauses (13).266
As one can gather from the grid, the First Amendment court rulings are
most predictive of case outcome. Courts have disclaimed jurisdiction when-
ever they determined that accepting it would impede the free exercise of relig-
ious beliefs or impermissibly entangle church and state. This result is hardly
surprising. Concluding that the adjudication process will infringe on the First
Amendment rights of a religious organization amounts to granting defendant an
exemption from Title VII scrutiny. Less obvious is the fact that each time
judges found a Title VII claim barred by one Religion Clause, they found the
other Clause to preclude judicial review as well. It is also instructive that the
courts have differed in their determination of which Title VII complaints run
afoul of the First Amendment and which do not.
Table 7 shows that the courts never split their decisions on the First
Amendment Religion Clauses. All high-entanglement-risk cases were also
judged to pose a high threat to free exercise, and vice versa. The fact that the
measured variables are perfectly correlated suggest that they may not measure
two separate realities. One of the two tests appears to be redundant, since
either inquiry predetermines the other inquiry's outcome. Indeed, some judges
265 See Table 3.
266 Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 814 F.2d 1213 (7th Cir. 1987). This case can be consid-
ered marginal in the present data base, for the court did not reach the ministerial exception in
its holding (the case was dismissed because plaintiff "failed to make out a valid claim of sex
discrimination under Title VII.") Id. at 1216. Nonetheless, the case is included in the grid
because the court did "assume arguendo" and determined in its dicta that the claim would
have failed on constitutional grounds even if it were factually valid.
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highlighted "[tihe similarity of the discrete inquiries" '2 67 underneath the surface
differences characterizing the Lemon and Sherbert tests.
The Lemon test ascertains whether a federal statute violates the First
Amendment Establishment Clause. It calls on the judges to "examine the char-
acter and purpose of the institution involved, the nature of the regulation's
intrusion into church affairs, and the resulting relationship between the govern-
ment and the religious authority." '26 8 To pass the test, the statute first "must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . [and third] the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion. '"'269
Paraphrasing the Lemon test (designated below by the letter "L"), we can say
that to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, a statute must be secular
in purpose (LI), neutral in stance (L2), and entanglement-free in outcome (L3).
The Sherbert test determines whether a statutory enactment violates the
Free Exercise Clause. In applying this test, the court weighs three factors:
(1) the magnitude of the statute's impact upon the exercise of the religious belief, (2)
the existence of a compelling state interest justifying the burden imposed upon the
exercise of the religious belief, and (3) the extent to which recognition of an exemp-
tion from the statute would impede the objectives sought to be advanced by the
state. 2 7 These precepts are harder to apply, for their language is not explicitly pre-
scriptive. One clue comes from Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment
Security Division, where the Supreme Court advised that "[t]he State may justify an
inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achiev-
ing some compelling state interest."
27 1
Given its judicial history, we can paraphrase the Sherbert test (designated
below by the letter "S") in this way: the state can regulate religious institutions
without violating the Free Exercise Clause if its regulatory scheme does not
impede free exercise (S 1), serves a compelling state interest (S2), and repre-
sents the least restrictive means of enforcing the state interest (S3).
To withstand the First Amendment scrutiny, therefore, a Title VII claim
has to satisfy the three prongs of each test.27 2 A court accepting jurisdiction
over a civil action by a religious institution employee must establish that the
Title VII statute is secular in purpose (LI), neutral in stance (L2), and entangle-
ment-free in outcome (L3), and that its enactment does not impede free exer-
cise (Si), serves a compelling state interest (S2), and is the least restrictive
enforcement option (S3). Mississippi College and Rayburn exemplify different
First Amendment test outcomes the courts have reached while trying to deter-
mine whether plaintiff has a legal recourse under Title VII.
The Mississippi College court is the first in case law history to deploy
both three-pronged tests and use them to confirm that an employee from a
267 Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F.
Supp. 2d 694, 704 n.9 (E.D.N.C. 1999).
268 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982) (paraphrasing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1971)).
269 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
270 Id. at 488 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963).
271 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
272 See Table 8.
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religious institution has a legitimate claim under Title VII. 273 The Mississippi
College court did not conduct an extensive inquiry when it applied LI and L2
to a discrimination claim brought by a psychology instructor in a denomina-
tional college. The court simply noted that defendant "does not contend that
Title VII has no secular legislative purpose," nor does it claim that the statute
"inhibits or advances religion as its primary effect." '27 4 On L3, the court deter-
mined that "the EEOC subpoena does not clearly implicate any religious prac-
tices of the College," that the burden a Title VII inquiry imposes "would be
largely hypothetical," and that consequently, the "application of the statute
would not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. 2175
Applying S1, the Mississippi College court found that the relevant inquiry
is "the impact of the statute upon the institution's exercise of its sincerely held
religious beliefs" and that the employment practices under review (race and sex
discrimination) "d[id] not embody religious beliefs," from which the court
inferred that "the impact of Title VII on the free exercise of religious beliefs is
minimal." 276
Moving to S2, the court established that by enacting Title VII, Congress
enunciated "a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in all forms"
and that "the government's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination is
sufficient to justify the minimal burden imposed upon the College's free exer-
cise of religious beliefs. 2 77
On S3, the court concluded that "creating an exemption from the statutory
enactment greater than that provided by § 702 would seriously undermine the
means chosen by Congress to combat discrimination and is not constitutionally
required. ' 278 Having thus balanced the religious employer's First Amendment
rights against the State's interest in creating a nondiscriminatory work environ-
ment, the Mississippi College court held "that the application of Title VII to
educational institutions such as Mississippi College does not violate the free
exercise clause of the first amendment. 279
Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists is an example
of a First Amendment analysis yielding the judgment nonreviewable on a Title
VII petition by a pastoral worker. With respect to Li and L2, the Rayburn
court stated that "there is no question that Title VII meets the first two of these
tests."28° On L3, the court determined that a "Title VII action is potentially a
lengthy proceeding, involving state agencies and commissions," that "[e]ven
after entry of judgment, questions of compliance may result in continued court
273 Earlier cases in the grid invoke both First Amendment Religion Clauses, but none
engaged all six prongs of the Sherbert and Lemon tests. The McClure court referred to both
Religion Clauses in its deliberation, McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.
1972), but conducted no independent Entanglement Clause analysis. See Smith v. Raleigh
Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 F. Supp. 2d 694, 704 n.9
(E.D.N.C. 1999).
274 EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 486 (5th Cir. 1980).
275 Id. at 487-88.
276 Id. at 488.
277 Id. at 488-89.
278 Id. at 489.
279 Id.
280 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985).
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surveillance," and that the "application of Title VII to employment decisions of
this nature would result in an intolerably close relationship between church and
state.
, 28 1
Applying S2, the Rayburn court conceded that it is "difficult to exaggerate
the magnitude of the state's interest in assuring equal employment opportuni-
ties for all, regardless of race, sex, or national origin. '28 2 Regarding S1, the
court established that an associate pastor has no valid sex or race discrimination
claims because "[any attempt to restrict a church's free choice of its leaders
... constitutes a burden on the church's free exercise rights." 283 And finally on
S3, the court determined that the "introduction of government standards to the
selection of spiritual leaders would significantly, and perniciously, rearrange
the relationship between church and state. '284 Hence, the Rayburn court ruled
against the plaintiff.
285
While both courts abide by the spirit of the First Amendment, neither fol-
lows the letter of the required tests. Mississippi College does not subject Title
VII and its § 702 provision to the first and second prong analyses stipulated by
the Lemon test before the court pronounces the statute secular in purpose and
neutral in stance. Nor does this court contemplate the full range of statutory
enforcement options available to the state before the court concludes that
imposing Title VII requirements on a denominational college is the least
restrictive enforcement option available under S3.
The Rayburn court also accepts without demonstration that Title VII
passes muster under LI and L2. It expresses its concern about the length of the
legal proceedings and the need for continuing surveillance (L3) and holds that
the impermissible church-state entanglement is likely to result from the judicial
review.
On the S2 prong, the Rayburn court acknowledges that the state's interest
in nondiscrimination is great but finds more compelling the church's constitu-
tional right under the Free Exercise Clause. There is no discernable judgment
on S3, as the court makes no attempt to analyze the range of statutory enact-
ment options and to show that other, less restrictive enforcement means, can be
used to accomplish the state's compelling regulatory objective articulated in
Title VII.
We should not overlook the characteristic language overlap in the Ray-
burn court's First Amendment analyses. On Li, the court finds that the "appli-
cation of Title VII to employment decisions of this nature would result in an
intolerably close relationship between church and state," '2 86 while on the S3
281 Id. at 1170-71.
282 Id. at 1168.
283 Id.
284 Id. at 1169.
285 The Raybum court found:
[T]he courts must distinguish incidental burdens on free exercise in the service of a compelling
state interest from burdens where "inroad on religious liberty" is too substantial to be permissi-
ble.... The balance of values thus weighs against Rayburn's suggestion that the government
may question the decision of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church to hire another candidate as an
associate in pastoral care.
Id. (citation omitted).
286 Id. at 1171.
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prong the court determines that the "introduction of government standards to
the selection of spiritual leaders would significantly, and perniciously, rear-
range the relationship between church and state., 28 7 This rhetorical overlap
shows how difficult it is to disentangle the substantive arguments and logical
procedures set forth in the Lemon and Sherbert tests. A closer look at the First
Amendment analyses undertaken by other courts in the present database reveals
similar inconsistencies.
While Mississippi College and Rayburn took for granted that Title VII
satisfies the Lemon test's first two prongs, King's Garden expressed serious
doubts about the statute's validity, for a "regulation neutral on its face may, in
its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for govern-
mental neutrality. 2 8 8 Pronouncing the § 702 exemption to be of "very doubt-
ful constitutionality, 2 89 the King's Garden court opined that "[i]n creating this
gross distinction between the rules facing religious and non-religious entrepre-
neurs, Congress placed itself on a collision course with the Establishment
Clause. Laws in this country must have a secular purpose and a 'primary
effect' which neither advances nor inhibits religion. 2 9 °
The Feldstein 91 and Dolter292 courts raised similar objections, the latter
case involving a ministerial function employee. This line of reasoning, which
can be called "the reverse entanglement argument," takes the government to
task for its hands-off policy with respect to discriminatory employment prac-
tices because the facially neutral stance may, and in the instant cases does,
tacitly confer on the church unfair advantages in competition with secular
employers.
The Supreme Court confronted this argument and struck it down in Amos
when it reversed the district court judgment that "§ 702 fails the second part of
the Lemon test because the provision has the primary effect of advancing relig-
ion."'293 In doing so, the Court reiterated its long-standing conclusion that
"[t]here is ample room under the Establishment Clause for 'benevolent neutral-
ity which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and with-
out interference.' , 294 The issue has not been laid to rest, however, and it is
287 Id. at 1169.
288 King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
289 Id. at 53.
290 Id. at 55.
291 The Feldstein court concluded:
The exemption presently afforded by Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 is a remarkably clumsy
accommodation of religious freedom with the compelling interests of the state, providing on the
one hand far too broad a shield for the secular activities of religiously affiliated entities with not
the remotest claim to first amendment protection while on the other hand permitting intrusions
into wholly religious activities.
Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 555 F. Supp. 974, 979 (D. Mass. 1983) (citing EEOC v.
S.W. Baptist Theological Seminary, 485 F. Supp. 255, 260 (N.D. Tex. 1980)).
292 "Indeed, to construe that [sic] section 2000e-1 to exempt All Forms [sic] of discrimina-
tion in sectarian schools would itself raise first amendment [sic] problems since it would
imply the government's special preference of sectarian schools over nonsectarian schools."
Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 269 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
293 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
294 Id. at 334 (citing Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970)).
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likely to surface again, given the reservations that Justices O'Connor, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackman expressed in their concurring opinions about the
majority's tendency to conflate a church's profit and nonprofit enterprises.2 9 5
The courts have differed in the ways they applied the Lemon test and
passed judgments on the prospects for an entanglement-free outcome. The
Ninth & 0 court acknowledged that the subpoena it authorized against a child
development center was "broad and sweeping," yet called the EEOC inquiry
only "somewhat burdensome" and the investigation process "minimally
intrud[ing] upon the center's and Ninth & O's religious beliefs [notice the Sher-
bert language in the last locution]." '2 96 Pacific Press also minimized the bur-
den that the EEOC investigation would impose on a religious publishing house,
suggesting that it falls short of "continuous supervision of the kind the Supreme
Court sought to avoid in Catholic Bishop. ' 97
By contrast, the courts that decline to review petitions by religious work-
ers and turn down the EEOC subpoena requests routinely cite NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, where the Supreme Court expressed concern that the very
process of judicial inquiry may lead to the entanglement. 298 Thus, the Maguire
court specifically noted the burden that the legal inquiry imposed on "the
defendant [who] had already been subjected to two years of extensive and bur-
densome discovery. ' ' 299 Other courts expressed similar concerns. 3° °
With regard to the Sherbert test, the adjudication process has focused on
the question of whether the contested employment practice is grounded in
church doctrine (S1) and whether the state interest embodied in Title VII is
compelling enough to override the church's free exercise rights (S2). The
Fremont court did not grant the religious employer exemption to the defendant
fighting off a sex discrimination suit because
Fremont Christian has previously abandoned a policy of paying the "head of house-
hold" at a rate higher than similarly situated female employees ... because they felt
that it may have been illegal to continue to do so. We find this to be evidence that
there would be no substantial impact upon religious beliefs by forcing Fremont
Christian to drop a similar policy of giving heads of household health insurance, to
the exclusion of similarly situated women.
30 1
In Pacific Press, the court held that granting judicial review would not
violate defendant's free exercise rights because "Congress' purpose to end dis-
crimination is equally if not more compelling than other interests that have
295 Id. at 340-49. See supra Section 1.4 for discussion.
296 Ninth & 0 St. Baptist Church v. EEOC, 616 F. Supp. 1231, 1234 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
297 EEOC v. Pac. Press Publ'g Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982). See also Bol-
lard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999).
298 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting NLRB v.
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979)).
299 Maguire v. Marquette Univ., 814 F.2d 1213, 1216 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987).
30 The Rayburn court singled out the "lengthy proceeding" and "the questions of compli-
ance [which] may result in continued court surveillance." Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1171 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Little v. Wuerl, 929
F.2d 944, 949 (3d Cir. 1991).
301 EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1986).
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been held to justify legislation that burdened the exercise of religious
convictions. 3 °2
In Ninth & 0, the judges turned down employer's claim that its decision is
not subject to the interference by the EEOC,3 °3 holding that "plaintiff has failed
to show that its interest in religious freedom under the facts is superior to the
public interest in having Title VII administered in a manner that protects all
employees to whom it extends its protection." 30 4
In Vigars, the court acknowledged the negative impact that its decision to
accept a Title VII petition from a pregnant employee working in a religious
school would have on the church's free exercise rights, but it still turned down
a doctrine-based discrimination defense with this characteristic post-Smith
rationale:
[I]t is clear that Title VII is a secular, neutral statute [notice the Lemon language in
the midst of the Sherbert test analysis] which, in this case, incidentally has a
profound impact on defendants' free exercise of their religion. As in Smith, however
(where that "incidental impact" was devastating), such incidental impact does not
constitute a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 30 5
The court's ruling in favor of claimants bringing forward a sexual harass-
ment suit are especially apt to emphasize that there is "no doubt that in order to
determine if plaintiff was sexually harassed, the court need not inquire into the
doctrines and religious goals of [a religious entity]. '30 6 "[W]here the church
provides no doctrinal nor protected-choice based rationale for its alleged action,
and indeed expressly disapproves of the alleged actions, a balancing of interests
strongly favors application of the [Title VII] statute.30 7
When the courts decline to review a Title VII petition, the Sherbert bal-
ancing scale tips in the opposite direction. In Young, plaintiff sought to con-
vince the court that reviewing her petition did not constitute "an 'extensive
inquiry' into 'religious law and polity,"' but the court disagreed, holding that
the deliberations about "hiring or firing of clergy ... are in themselves an
'extensive inquiry' into religious law and practice, and hence forbidden by the
First Amendment. Young's argument, that Title VII may be applied to deci-
sions by churches affecting the employment of their clergy, is fruitless. 30 8 In
turning down a sex discrimination claim, the Combs court observed that any
inquiry into a grievance by a clergy member "would be necessarily coercive,
even if the alleged discrimination were purely nondoctrinal. ' 3 9 The outcome
that the Sherbert balancing test yielded in this case is typical of all cases where
religious employers receive the § 702 exemption:
This case involves the interrelationship between two important governmental direc-
tives - the congressional mandate to eliminate discrimination in the workplace and
302 Pac. Press, 676 F.2d at 1272.
303 Ninth & 0 St. Baptist Church v. EEOC, 616 F. Supp. 1231, 1232 (W.D. Ky. 1985).
304 Id. at 1235.
305 Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 809-10 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
306 Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop, 1991 WL 36712, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1991).
307 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 1999).
308 Young v. N. Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir.
1994).
30 Combs v. Cent. Texan Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999).
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the constitutional mandate to preserve the separation of church and state. As this
court previously observed in McClure, both of these mandates cannot always be fol-
lowed. In such circumstances, the constitutional mandate must override the mandate
that is merely congressional.31 0
Several conclusions can be drawn from this overview, pinpointing the
weaknesses of the existing paradigm for the First Amendment Religion
Clauses' analyses.
(1) The First Amendment analyses in the cases comprising the present
database routinely mix the language of the Lemon and Sherbert tests. The rhet-
oric of "entanglement" distinguishing the Lemon test is echoed in the language
of "impediment" that characterizes the Sherbert test. While the Lemon test
focuses on case outcome, the deliberations frequently touch upon the chilling
effect that the very process of inquiry is likely to have on the church's free
exercise rights. The Sherbert test was intended to measure the impact that judi-
cial review has on religious beliefs, yet it may well end up with the warning
against the impermissibly close relationship between church and state.
(2) The current Free Exercise test does not provide clear guidance for
weighing state interest in nondiscrimination against the constitutional rights of
religious organizations. In the words of one scholar, "[Sluch a test provides no
norm for determining how much or at what point a compelling interest can
interfere with a group's religious interests. '311 Nor does the Free Exercise test
help predict where the court can order a church to alter a discriminatory prac-
tice rooted in church doctrine, and where it has to defer to the church's First
Amendment rights.
(3) Not all parts of the Sherbert and Lemon tests have been given equal
attention by the courts. 83 is the least engaged prong in the judicial review
process. None of the courts in the twenty-eight case database have considered
less restrictive options available to the state pursuing its interest in nondiscrimi-
nation before entering judgment on a Title VII claim. Yet, without such delib-
eration, there is no meaningful way to measure "the extent to which recognition
of an exemption from the statute would impede the objectives sought to be
advanced by the state. ' 312 The Mississippi College court came closest to
thematizing this issue when it observed that "[a]lthough the number of religious
educational institutions is minute in comparison to the number of employers
subject to Title VII, their effect upon society at large is great because of the role
they play in educating society's young. "313 Even this holding does not eluci-
date the criteria behind the court's judgment or spell out the alternatives open
to the state enforcing its interest in nondiscrimination.
(4) S2 does not pull its weight in the Sherbert analysis, either. No court
has ever quibbled with the premise that creating a nondiscriminatory work
environment is a state interest of highest priority. To the extent that the inquiry
confirms this self-evident fact, it begets a truism. The real issue is whether this
is "the" highest priority or "a" highest priority, whether the interest in question
is compelling enough to override the church's rights under the First Amend-
310 Id. at 351.
311 Okamoto, supra note 22, at 1416.
312 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
313 EEOC v. Miss. Coll., 626 F.2d 477, 489 (5th Cir. 1980).
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ment. Such an inquiry is wholly dependent on the outcome of the Si analysis,
which determines whether the regulatory scheme impedes free exercise. If the
answer to the S1 question is affirmative, the answer to the S2 query is
irrelevant.
(5) The LI and L2 prongs in the Lemon test have also lost much of their
punch after the Amos court determined that Title VII is a "secular" and "neu-
tral" statute fully compliant with the Lemon test. The doubts that the King's
Garden court aired about the statute's neutrality in its reverse entanglement
argument may resurface if someone challenges in court the designation "relig-
ious" that churches attach to their allegedly nonprofit undertakings. For the
time being, we have to assume that, as a matter of law, Title VII and its § 702
provision constitute a statute that is secular in purpose and neutral in stance.
(6) S I and L3 are the only practical guidelines we have in ascertaining
whether the court has jurisdiction over an employment discrimination claim by
a religious function employee or whether the court should grant the religious
employer an exemption from Title VII scrutiny. To meet the logical require-
ments and fulfill their judicial role, these inquiries should be sufficiently sepa-
rate to yield independent outcomes. This brings us back to the Bollard court's
innovative reasoning on substantive and procedural entanglement.
For the most part, Bollard follows a well-trodden path in its First Amend-
ment analysis when it brings the Sherbert and Lemon tests to bear on the sexual
harassment claim brought under Title VII by a novitiate in a Jesuit religious
order.314 The court issues familiar warnings against state meddling in ecclesi-
astical matters, such as the "church's selection of its own clergy" and the
"ecclesiastical self-governance with which the state may not constitutionally
interfere."31 However, the Bollard court does not contend that plaintiff is not
a ministerial function employee, insisting only that by refusing to contest the
church's right to fire him and by foreswearing injunctive relief and reinstate-
ment as a remedy, John Bollard deprived the church of the "protected-choice
based rationale" under the Free Exercise Clause and tipped the "balanc[e] of
interests strongly [in favor of the] application of the statute. ' '316
After disposing of S I and S2 and completely bypassing S3, the Bollard
court moves to the Lemon test. The court cites Minker v. Baltimore Annual
Conference of United Methodist Church with its memorable dicta reiterating
the district court statement that the "determination of 'whose voice speaks for
the church' is per se a religious matter. . . .We cannot imagine an area of
inquiry less suited to a temporal court for decision; evaluation of 'gifts and
graces' of a minister must be left to ecclesiastical institutions. ' 317 Then, the
Bollard court departs from the familiar path by adding a fresh wrinkle to the
Entanglement Clause analysis. "[E]ntanglement has both substantive and pro-
cedural dimensions. '318 Substantive entanglement refers to the fact that the
314 Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc'y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 1999).
315 Id. at 946.
316 Id. at 947-48.
317 Id. at 949 (citing Minker v. Bait. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
318 Id. By way of antecedents, we should note that the Rayburn court spoke in similar terms
about "an intolerably close relationship between church and state both on substantive and
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judicial review may require trial courts to dwell on ecclesiastical reasons
behind the church's decision to retain, promote, demote, or fire its clergy, and
thereby to foster "a constitutionally impermissible entanglement with religion
... [where] the church's freedom to choose its minister is at stake. ' 3 19 Proce-
dural entanglement refers to the protracted legal proceedings, as well as to the
fact that the "remedies that a district court may impose ... may be far-reaching
in their impact upon religious organization." 320 Neither substantive nor proce-
dural entanglement poses a problem in Bollard, because "in discussing the Free
Exercise Clause, such substantive concerns are absent from this case," 32 ' and
"[where such a concern is absent, procedural entanglement considerations are
reduced to the constitutional propriety of subjecting a church to the expense
and indignity of the civil legal process. '3 22 The plaintiffs Title VII action
could go forward, the court concluded, since the trial proceedings would
involve only a restricted inquiry that would not "require a jury to evaluate relig-
ious doctrine or the 'reasonableness' of the religious practices followed within
the Jesuit order," and because the claimant does not seek remedies that "might
require continuing court surveillance. '"323
We can see that the Entanglement Clause and Free Exercise Clause analy-
ses get entangled in Bollard, with the protected-choice rationale figuring prom-
inently in both Lemon and Sherbert test deliberations, and church-state
entanglement making an appearance once in section "A" titled "The Free Exer-
cise Clause ' 324 and the second time in section "B" titled "The Establishment
Clause. '3 25 The protected-choice rationale safeguards the church's right to
select its clergy without state interference as well as the possibility of a doc-
trine-neutral trial. I would argue that both are intricately tied. Dwelling on the
ecclesiastical criteria for selecting ministers engenders substantive entangle-
ment, just as second-guessing a church's clergy appointments is bound to
implicate the spiritual criteria for selecting ministers. By the same token, the
church-state relationship violates the no-entanglement provision insofar as it
draws the court into monitoring the church's compliance with court orders, and
impedes free exercise insofar as it blocks doctrine-based conduct. Once again,
it is hard to envision the church-state relationship impermissibly entangled
under one First Amendment Religion Clause that would not logically entail a
violation of the other First Amendment Religion Clause.
I propose that we adopt the Bollard language, using "substantive entangle-
ment" to designate a doctrine-neutral/doctrine-entangled adjudication process
and "procedural entanglement" to stand for a judicial process outcome that
imposes an incidental-burden/heavy-burden on the defendant. Substantive
procedural level," one pertaining to the unreviewable spiritual criteria which the church uses
to select its clergy, and the other referring to the length of court proceedings and the perva-
sive monitoring that the court decisions might bring in their wake. Rayburn v. Gen. Confer-
ence of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1170-71 (4th Cir. 1985).




323 Id. at 950.
324 Id. at 945-48.
325 id.
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entanglement is evident in cases where the courts have to ponder ecclesiastical
matters, second-guess the church's administrative decisions, judge the religious
employer's good faith, consider conduct grounded in church doctrine, weigh
the extent to which a plaintiff embodies church teachings, or deliberate on the
seriousness of a religious infraction. Empirical indicators signaling procedural
entanglement would then include the length of legal proceedings, the sweep of
the subpoena, the need for continuous monitoring and surveillance, and the
request for prospective relief and class action remedies.
This approach to a First Amendment analysis and the proposed substan-
tive/procedural entanglement tests have several advantages.
(1) The emphasis on substantive and procedural entanglement upholds the
First Amendment spirit, allowing the church to maintain its ecclesiastical
autonomy and select its clergy without government intrusion, and at the same
time, vindicating the state interest in nondiscrimination embodied in the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The substantive and procedural entanglement measure-
ments are consistent with the Religion Clause jurisprudence insofar as they
build on and preserve the vital parts of the Lemon and Sherbert tests, with the
substantive entanglement test embodying the Free Exercise objective and the
procedural entanglement test fulfilling the Entanglement Clause agenda.
(2) The model advocated in this paper insures that the Free Exercise and
Entanglement tests do not duplicate each other. The suggested procedures
allow the legal test to produce outcomes independent from each other. We can
envision cases where a doctrine-neutral trial will result in excessive procedural
entanglement and ecclesiastically-entangled court deliberations pose no danger
of excessive procedural entanglement.
(3) The key juridical variables tracked by the proposed First Amendment
tests are not necessarily nominal - they lend themselves to interval scaling. We
can measure a low, moderate, and high procedural burden that the adjudication
process imposes on the religious employer, just as we can ascertain the mini-
mal, moderate, and maximum extent to which judicial inquiry would require
courts to dwell on doctrinal matters.
(4) The new paradigm for the First Amendment Religion Clause analyses
is likely to increase the clergy's access to the courts by shifting attention away
from the ministerial status of religious workers and toward the conditions under
which the judicial review process is framed in such a way that the court can
deliberate on the facts without trespassing on constitutionally-protected ecclesi-
astical ground and imposing an excessive procedural burden on religious insti-
tutions. The Bollard logic may be extended beyond sexual harassment actions
to sex and race discrimination claims by clergy members, who form one of the
least protected employment groups in the United States.
(5) Finally, the proposed scheme for adjudicating Title VII claims by
religious workers would relieve the courts from making the invidious compari-
son between the right of clergy to work in an environment free from discrimi-
nation and harassment and the right of the church to exercise religious beliefs
without state interference. Both rights represent interests equally compelling
and fully entitled to constitutional and statutory protection.
Table 9 represents the case outcomes reconsidered in line with the sub-
stantive and procedural entanglement tests laid out in this section. The coding
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guidelines show how the cases were assigned to a particular quadrant in the
grid. The empirical indicators for substantive entanglement highlight the cases
where judicial review is likely to involve (a) evaluating the church's adminis-
trative decisions, (b) judging the employer's good faith, (c) dealing with con-
duct grounded in church doctrine, (d) weighing the extent to which plaintiff
embodies church teachings, and (e) pretextual defense. Empirical indicators
signaling procedural entanglement mark the cases distinguished by (a) length of
legal proceedings, (b) breadth of subpoena, (c) monitoring compliance, (d)
class action, and (e) prospective remedies. The case is rated "high" on substan-
tive entanglement, designated below by the letters SE, when three or more
empirical indicators suggest that judicial inquiry will require a ruling on eccle-
siastical matters. Two empirical indicators point to the "medium" and one or
none to "low" score on substantive entanglement. The same guidelines have
been used to identify cases with the "high" (three or more relevant empirical
indicators), "medium" (two indicators) and "low" (one or none) levels of proce-
dural entanglement, marked below with the letters PE.
The objection can be raised that the PE/SE test compromises the dichoto-
mous quality of the variables in question, that there might be permissible and
impermissible shades of entanglement, that "a moderately entangled govern-
ment" is like "moderately fresh fish" - both stink to high heaven. Alas, the
language the courts have actually used in analyzing the relevant case law sug-
gests that the government's entanglement in church affairs is indeed a matter of
degree that does not lend itself readily to an either/or judgment. There will
always be cases too close to call, as well as the ones with genuinely unique fact
patterns, but the PE/SE model might help determine how the case is to be
disposed.
In Table 9, cases found in the quadrants PE3/SE3, PE3/SE2, and PE2/SE3
are supposed to be nonreviewable - they represent a high risk of church-state
entanglement and pose an intolerably high threat to the church's free exercise
rights. At the opposite pole, cases in the quadrants PEl/SEl, PE2/SE1, and
PEI/SE2 can be readily accepted for review without violating the religious
employers' First Amendment rights. The middle quadrant - PE2/SE2 -
harbors cases that may be held reviewable or nonreviewable, depending on the
fact situation which may tip the balance in one direction or the other. Quad-
rants PEI/SE3 and PE3/SE1 contain cases that score high on one of the mea-
surements and low on the other. If plaintiff is a nonministerial function
employee, the balancing of rights favors plaintiff over defendant, and if plain-
tiff is a pastoral worker, the balance of values goes to the religious employer.
Comparing the actual court holdings on the reviewability of the cases in
the grid with the PE/SE test outcomes, we can see that the proposed model is
consistent with most court decisions. Ten out of sixteen cases (1, 10, 13, 14,
16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 27) where the courts rejected ministerial function employee
Title VII claims and granted defendants' motions to dismiss are situated in the
quadrants PE3/SE3, PE3/SE2, PE2/SE3 representing the high-to-moderate
entanglement risk and/or high-to-moderate threat to free exercise. Three more
cases (6, 8, 22) where the defendants received an exemption from Title VII
scrutiny are located in the PE1/SE3 and PE3/SE1 quadrants and score high on
one of the two dimensions and low on the other. The remaining three cases
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(12, 24, 26) where defendants won the motion to dismiss are in the middle
quadrant PE2/SE2. These cases include two claims by ministerial function
employees (24, 26) and one by an ordained minister working in a nonpastoral
capacity (12). This is where the courts could have taken a closer look at the
possibility of a doctrine-neutral and procedurally unentangled inquiry and
accepted the case for review. Accepting petition for review is not the same
thing as finding merit in the claim and granting plaintiff relief. Still, allowing
the trial court to conduct a doctrine-neutral review would increase the clergy's
access to the courts and vindicate their equal protection rights.
Most cases where the courts accepted a Title VII claim for judicial review
(5, 25, 3, 15, 18, 28) are situated in the PE1/SE1, PE1/SE2, PE2/SEI quadrants,
marking low-to-medium levels of substantive and procedural entanglement.
Two more cases are located in the PE1/SE3 quadrant (11, 20), and one each in
the PE2/SE2 quadrant (2), the PE2/SE3 quadrant (7), PE3/SE2 quadrant (9),
and PE3/SE1 quadrant (4). Two ministerial function employees who managed
to convince the courts that their Title VII claims were reviewable (15, 28) are
situated in the PE1/SE1 quadrant, designating the fact situation with the lowest
threat to free exercise and the lowest risk of entanglement - a decision consis-
tent with the proposed adjudication scheme. The third pastoral plaintiff who
won the decision to proceed with the Title VII claim belongs to the PE1/SE3
quadrant which stands for the high procedural and low substantive entangle-
ment fact pattern (4). This is Dolter v. Wahlert High School 3 2 6 where plaintiff
persuaded the court that the material issue of fact existed as to whether the
church ban on premarital sex was equally applied to both unmarried men and
unmarried women. This is a good example of how the court can lay out a
blueprint for a doctrine-neutral trial which is deferential to the church's free
exercise rights and sympathetic to the clergy's right to be protected from
employment discrimination.
Table 9 shows that not all court judgments that favored Title VII claimants
were beyond criticism. The PE3/SE3 quadrant includes Ninth & 0 Street Bap-
tist Church v. EEOC. If plaintiff in this case was a pastoral worker (the court
did not rule on plaintiffs ministerial status), then the decision should have
favored defendant, given the sweeping nature of the EEOC subpoena, the like-
lihood of court surveillance, and a religious infraction with which the defendant
justified its adverse employment decision. One could also quibble with the
decision favoring the plaintiff in EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n,
where the religious employer justified unequal health insurance provisions by
the ecclesiastical reasons favoring male heads of household (7). Otherwise, the
balancing of rights in similar cases involving nonministerial employees work-
ing for religious organizations should have favored plaintiffs.
Table 9 can also clue pastoral workers on how they can increase their
chance to have courts recognize their Title VII petitions, learning in particular
from sexual harassment cases. Most such cases involve "but for" cause pretex-
tual hearings where the defendant tries to counter a sexual harassment claim
with a religious infraction argument as justification for an adversarial employ-
ment decision. Several recent court decisions indicate that a doctrine-neutral
326 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980).
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trial can be successfully constructed for pastoral workers as well. 327 Whatever
the ultimate outcome, these clergy members know that they have won their day
in court and that their rights under Title VII have been vindicated.
CONCLUSION
Law is a system of preferences and exclusions that privileges some groups
while discriminating against others. The history of federal employment statutes
testifies to this conclusion. A look at key legislation reveals how federal
employment statutes passed by Congress in the last few decades have progres-
sively expanded legal protection to new groups while preserving discrimination
classes through exemptions granted to selected employers.3 28
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was aimed at rooting out employment dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin, but it
excused the U.S. Congress, Judiciary, and Executive Branch from compliance
with this lofty goal. It was not until the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that the
federal government extended Title VII provisions to its employees. It took
years for Title VII protection to cover individuals working for small business
with less than fifty, twenty-five, and eventually, fifteen employees. Private
membership clubs and overseas enterprises are still exempted from the statute's
reach. And federal laws offer no protection to gay and lesbian workers and to
employees with unpopular political beliefs.
American clergy that crusaded for the Civil Rights Act did so with the full
knowledge that Title VII guarantees of discrimination-free work environment
would not extend to the clergy. And while church activists did not receive the
blank exemption they expected, clergy is one discrimination class that did not
secure protection under Title VII. The ministerial exception exempted religious
institution employment decisions involving clergy from Title VII scrutiny on
First Amendment grounds.329 Yet, the actual scope of the ministerial exception
and § 702 exemption for religious employers has varied from one judicial hold-
ing to another, as the courts have struggled to determine under what circum-
stances state interest in nondiscrimination overrides the church's rights under
the First Amendment.
While the question "whose voice speaks for the church' 33° has been
answered conclusively, the question "whose voice speaks for the government"
is still a source of contention. In our tripartite political system, Congress legis-
lates, the judiciary adjudicates, and the executive branch enforces statutory
mandates as interpreted by the legal authority. One thing that the historical
overview of Title VII and § 702 judicial construction makes clear is that the
state does not speak in one voice. The three branches of U.S. government have
disagreed over the scope of the religious employer exemption.
327 See Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63
F. Supp. 2d 694, 704 (E.D.N.C. 1999); see also Bollard, 196 F.3d at 945; Vigars v. Valley
Christian Ctr., 805 F. Supp. 802, 807 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
328 See Table 10.
329 McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
330 Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354,
1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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With one exception,33 1 all Title VII claims reviewed in this paper were
backed by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, an agency oper-
ated by the executive branch, yet less than half were accepted for judicial
review. This fact indicates that the executive branch sided with Congress in its
belief that the state mandate to ensure a workplace free from discrimination
trumps the religious employers' rights to do business without state interference.
For its part, Congress saw dissension within its ranks regarding the scope
of Title VII. In its 1963 legislative act, the House exempted religious employ-
ers from all judicial review under Title VII, but the Senate found this measure
unjustified and drastically narrowed the scope of the religious employer exemp-
tion.33' The 1972 amendment broadened the scope of § 702 with respect to
religion-based discrimination but kept religious organizations accountable for
violations of Title VII prohibitions against race, color, sex and national origin
discrimination. The McClure court found a way to reconcile § 702 with the
First Amendment Religion Clauses,3 33 while the King's Garden court held
Title VII inconsistent with the Establishment Clause prohibiting regulations
that favor religion over nonreligion.3 34 The Supreme Court settled the issue in
1987 by holding Title VII fully compliant with the Establishment Clause
requirements inscribed in the Lemon test, extending § 702 to all religious enter-
prises and immunizing them against religion - based discrimination claims.335
In 1989, the pendulum appeared to have swung back toward a broader
interpretation of Title VII protections, as the Supreme Court in Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith cast doubt on
the need to balance the church's First Amendment rights with state interests
articulated by "a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law."' 336 Congress
countered with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act that required the judici-
ary to use the Sherbert balancing test before it imposed on religious employers
statutory regulations infringing on their Free Exercise rights.3 37 And once
again, the Supreme Court ruled that Congress overstepped the bounds of its
authority and declared RFRA unconstitutional.
33 8
This multivocal history of Title VII construction need not be construed as
political cacophony. Rather, what we witness is a constitutional polyphony
mandated by our political system that gives each branch of government its own
sphere of authority and assures the ongoing balancing between competing polit-
ical interests. By the same token, the contradictions in the courts' decisions are
331 Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of the Seventh-Day Adventists of the United Meth-
odist Church, 166 F.3d 1208 (Table), 1998 WL 904528 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1998).
332 See supra Section 1.2.
133 McClure, 460 F.2d 553.
13 King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
335 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
336 494 U.S. 872, 880 (1989).
337 See supra section 1.4.
338 It should be noted that the Smith holding, though facially neutral, is open to criticism
under the Lemon rationale, insofar as it reveals a cultural bias against the ritual use of
peyote, a generally harmless practice wide-spread in the Native American Church, while a
far more destructive substance - alcohol - remains readily available for both ritual and
nonritual use to members of the Anglo-Saxon majority culture.
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to be seen not as a sign of judicial disarray but as evidence that the U.S. judici-
ary remains sensitive to competing voices embedded in our constitutional and
legislative history. "The life of law has not been logic," said Justice Holmes,
"[i]t has been experience." 339 We need to remind ourselves of this dicta as we
trace the history of federal statutes, their legislative, judicial, and executive
construction. It is incumbent upon legal scholars to identify the tensions
endemic to the judicial process and search for ways to make the outcome of
judicial reviews transparent and fair. The Case Law Grid Analysis (CLGA)
developed in this paper offers a tool for analyzing judicial construction, track-
ing historical trends in the judicial review process, and devising new ways for
assessing civil action's admissibility under the First Amendment.
Building on the strength of the existing typological approaches, the CLGA
seeks to avoid their shortcomings. The best typological schemes isolate several
juridical variables and organize them into a general taxonomy, which is then
overimposed on empirical reality, with individual cases best exemplifying the
theoretical model selected from the universe of relevant case law to interpret
the theoretical model.34 ° Such a methodology offers useful guidelines for navi-
gating among disparate cases, treated as exemplars of standard situations gov-
erned by general principles. Powerful and intellectually stimulating, this
approach has several weaknesses, insofar as it does not explicate the coding
procedures for assigning cases to particular taxons, glosses over inconsistencies
in allegedly similar fact situations, uses individual cases as illustrations, rarely
spells out parameters of the case law under review, and fails to consider the
entire universe of relevant cases.
The CLGA starts with defining the parameters of the case law set and then
maps the cases into a conceptual grid. Insofar as such a grid is formed by key
juridical variables abstracted from individual cases, the CLGA stalks familiar
methodological grounds. It moves beyond ad hoc typology by cross-tabulating
information and correlating all juridical variables. This procedure reveals pat-
terns barely discernable when we pick the cases on an ad hoc basis. The CLGA
focuses attention on the act of classification and fact pattern identification.
While traditional legal research tends to take this act for granted, social scien-
tists have shown that coding procedures entail systematic misattribution reflect-
ing the classifier's biases.341
More than a device allowing the analyst to scan many variables at a
glance, the grid is a useful tool for discovering hidden patterns, inconsistencies,
and paradoxes. Which juridical variables are included in the grid depends on
the task at hand. For the present study, I have focused on the variables com-
monly used in Title VII legal studies and First Amendment jurisprudence
devoted to the state-church relationship, such as religious employer type, minis-
terial status, discrimination claims, and Religion Clause analysis. In addition to
these variables, the case law grid tracks charges filed, remedies sought, plain-
tiffs' gender, the right of women to stand for ordination, and related character-
339 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881).
340 For representative examples, see Bagni, supra note 23; Laycock, supra note 23;
Buchanan, supra note 23.
341 See, e.g., H. GARFINKEL, STUDIES IN EmHNOMETHODOLOGY (Prentice-Hall 1967). (See
Part IV, "Some Rules of Correct decisions that Jurors respect.")
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
istics. There are other juridical variables bearing on case outcome, including
court levels, systems, and venues; judges, prosecutors, and attorneys working in
the case law field; defendants' and plaintiffs' legal strategies; type and quality
of legal representation; institutional resources available to the litigants; eviden-
tiary characteristics distinguishing the case; and many other legal and extra-
legal variables which can be used as a powerful predictive tool by the parties to
the dispute.
Much of the insight that the CLGA has to offer will probably be known to
good legal scholars and practitioners working in a given field, but some sur-
prises may well be in stock, particularly when we deal with large databases and
track long time periods. In such cases, a standard CLGA may be comple-
mented by sampling techniques and multivariate analysis designed to track
clusters of variables with high interpretive-predictive power. This technique
can also be used to study macroscopic trends across legal fields, compare the
developments in neighboring areas of jurisprudence, identify areas where the
law is unsettled, pinpoint domains requiring additional legal resources, as well
as for other lines of legal inquiry.
Finally, CLGA methodology might help scholars develop new legal tests
and adjudication models that would aid the judiciary in its never-ending quest
for clarity, consistency, predictability, and fairness. The procedural/substantive
entanglement inquiry - the PE/SE model for the First Amendment analysis
developed in this paper as an alternative to the traditional Lemon and Sherbert
tests - is an example of what CLGA methodology has to offer legal research.
While practical value of this test is far from certain, it is my hope that the
approach suggested in this paper will stimulate further work in this vital area of
First Amendment jurisprudence.
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TABLE 1. LIST OF CASES
o [Case Name Citation Jcor I _Year
I McClure v. Salvation Army 460 F.2d 553 5th Cir. 1972
2 King's Garden, Inc. v. Fed. Communication Comm'n 498 F.2d 51 D.C. Cir. 1974
3 Whitney v. Greater New York Corp. of Seventh-dayAdventists 401 F. Supp. 1363 S.D.N.Y. 1975
4 Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch. 483 F. Supp. 266 N.D. Iowa 1980
5 EEOC v. Mississippi College 626 F.2d 477 5th Cir. 1980
6 EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary 651 F.2d 277 5th Cir. 1981
7 EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ'g Ass'n 676 F.2d 1272 9th Cir. 1982
8 Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor 555 F. Supp. 974 D. Mass. 1983
9 Ninth & 0 Street Baptist Church v. EEOC 616 F. Supp. 1231 W.D. Ky. 1985
10 Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-dayAdventists 772 F.2d 1164 4th Cir. 1985
11 EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch. 781 F.2d 1362 9th Cir. 1986
1987 WL 18470 D.D.C.
12 Carter v. Baltimore Ann. Conference SSH 1987
13 Maguire v. Marquette Univ. 814 F.2d 1213 7th Cir. 1987
Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 483 U.S. 327, 107 U.S.
14 Latter-day Saints v. Amos S.Ct. 2862 1987
15 Nigrelli v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 1991 WL 36712 N.D. Ill. 1991
16 Sharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp. 929 F.2d 360 8th Cir. 1991
17 Little v. Wuerl 929 F.2d 944 3d Cir. 1991
18 Elbaz v. Congregation Beth Judea, Inc. 812 F. Supp. 802 N.D. Ill. 1992
19 EEOC v. Presbyterian Ministries, Inc. 788 F. Supp. 1154 W.D. Wash. 1992
20 Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr of Dublin, California 805 F. Supp. 802 N.D. Cal. 1992
21 Young v. Northern Illinois Conf. of United Methodist Church 21 F.3d 184 7th Cir. 1994
22 Van Osdol v. Vogt 908 P.2d 1122 Colo. 1996
23 EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of America 83 F.3d 455 D.C. Cir. 1996
Clapper v. Chesapeake Conference of Seventh-day Adventists 1998 WL 904528 4th Cir. (Md.)
24 and Gruesebeck 1998
Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of the North Carolina Conference of the 63 F. Supp. 2d 694 E.D.N.C.
25 United Methodist Church 1999
Combs v. Cen. Texan Ann. Con. of the United Methodist 173 F.3d 343 5th Cir
26 Church 1999
27 EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, North Carolina 48 F. Supp. 2d 505 E.D.N.C. 1999
28 Bollard v. California Province of the Socy of Jesus 196 F.3d 940 9th Cir. 1999
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TABLE 2. CASE SUMMARIES
No] CaseName Summary
I McClure An ordained minister brought a civil action against her church alleging sex discrimination
as evidenced by the smaller salary and fewer benefits provided to the female officers. The
court dismissed plaintiffs suit, holding that the relationship between a church and its
ministers is its lifeblood, that it is the means by which the church fulfills its goals, and that
the application of Title VII to the employment relationship under the circumstances would
encroach on religious freedom in violation of the First Amendment.
King's Garden A non-profit, interdenominational radio station licensee filed petition for review of the
FCC's order to stop religion-based employment discrimination. The court found the FCC's
regulatory scheme to be sound and refused to grant defendant the exemption under § 702 in
a strongly worded statement that questioned the statute's constitutionality.
Whitney A white typist-receptionist brought suit against her church alleging that she had been
discharged because of her relationship with a black man. The court denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss, holding that the alleged discrimination was not based on any religious
doctrine and thus did not exempt the employer from Title VII scrutiny.
Dolter An unmarried English teacher at a sectarian high school alleged sex discrimination after she
was dismissed due to her pregnancy. The court refused to grant summary judgment holding
that an issue of material fact existed as to whether the sectarian school was applying its ban
on premarital sex equally to male and female employees.
5 Mississippi A white female instructor sought to enforce a subpoena issued by the E.E.O.C. after the
College College failed to hire her for a full-time position. The court held that plaintiff had standing
to pursue her claim of racially motivated hiring and sex discrimination and that prosecuting
these Title VII claims would not abridge the religious institution's constitutional rights.
6 Southwestern The E.E.O.C. brought suit against the seminary demanding that it file a Higher Education
Baptist Staff Information (EEO-6) report. The court held that the seminary may refuse to file forms
for faculty and staff members whose primary job function was ministerial but had to supply
the requisite information about support and administrative employees whose primary job
content was not religious.
7 Pacific Press An editorial secretary working for a non-profit publishing house affiliated with the Seventh-
Day Adventist Church brought a sex discrimination suit against her employer. The court
held that the application of Title VII did not violate the First Amendment since she was not
a minister and her duties did not entail ministerial responsibilities.
Feldstein Plaintiff filed an employment discrimination suit against a sectarian publishing house
alleging that his job application was summarily dismissed because he was not a Church
member. The court held that since the newspaper operated for a religious purpose, it was
permissible for the Church to require all applicants to be Church members.
Ninth & 0 A teacher was discharged from her position at a church-sponsored Early Childhood
Development Center because she failed to join the church. Plaintiff filed a complaint with
the E.E.O.C., charging retaliatory discharge after she contacted the E.E.O.C. office
regarding the church's personnel policy. The court held that the E.E.O.C had the right to
conduct an inquiry into whether the Center's policy was inconsistent with Title VII.
10 Rayburn A white member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church denied a pastoral position brought
action against her church, alleging sex discrimination and race discrimination stemming
from her association with black persons and black religious organizations. The court held
that the ministerial exception shields the religious employer from Title VII scrutiny, which
would violate the defendant's free exercise rights and result in excessive church-state
entanglement.
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11 Fremont A married female school employee brought a civil action against a church which offered
health insurance coverage to employees who were the male heads of households, but denied
it to married female employees. The court held the church liable and allowed suit to
proceed since the required Title VII inquiry would not interfere with the church's
constitutional rights.
12 Carter A Methodist minister serving in a non-religious administrative capacity filed suit alleging
race and color discrimination after he was disciplined and subsequently dismissed by his
employer. The court held for the defendant, stating that adjudicating the employment
dispute between the church and its minister would entangle the government in church
affairs.
13 Maguire A woman denied promotion to associate professorship in theology at Marquette University
filed a Title VII claim charging sex discrimination and a supplementary claim alleged that
plaintiff was treated unfairly because of her views on abortion. The court dismissed the suit
after being satisfied that the defense had nondiscriminatory reasons for denying the
promotion.
14 Amos A building engineer at the Deseret Gymnasium, a Mormon Church nonprofit facility, was
discharged after he failed to qualify as a church member in good standing. Plaintiff brought
a class-action suit against his employer alleging religious discrimination. The Supreme
Court granted the employer § 702 exemption, holding that courts should not second guess
churches as to which of their activities are genuinely religious and that churches should be
allowed to discriminate in favor of coreligionists in their hiring practices.
15 Nigrelli A female principal at St. Mary Star of the Sea Parish school brought an action alleging
sexual harassment and wrongful constructive discharge. The court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, holding that the termination could have been a pretext for
sex discrimination and that a Title VII inquiry was not barred by the First Amendment
considerations, since it could be conducted without reference to the church doctrine.
16 Scharon An ordained priest serving as chaplain at a Presbyterian hospital was fired for violating
canonical law. Plaintiff sued, charging age and gender discrimination. The court granted
the hospital's motion for summary judgment, holding that the hospital was a religious
organization and a chaplain's duties were primarily ministerial.
17 Little A Catholic parochial school refused to renew ajob contract with a teacher after she
remarried without following the canonical process required by the church. Plaintiff filed
suit alleging religious discrimination. The court found the claim to be without merit,
holding that the church was within its rights to require that its employees conform to the
canonical standards.
18 Elbaz An education director in a religious day school alleged sex and national origin
discrimination after the Congregation refused to renew her employment contract following
her complaint about the employer's tardy payments to her retirement plan. Going against
precedent involving religious-function employees, the court denied the Congregation's
motion to dismiss, holding that Title VII bars discrimination based on sex, race, or national
origin.
19 Presbyterian A receptionist working at a Christian church-operated retirement home was not allowed to
Ministries wear her Muslim headgear. Following her discharge, plaintiff alleged constructive
wrongful termination. The court granted defendant the § 702 exemption, holding that Title
VII did not require a religious organization to accommodate religious symbols of another
faith.
20 Vigars An unmarried librarian at a parochial school was fired from her job after she became
pregnant. Plaintiff brought Title VII action charging sex discrimination. The court denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the application of Title VII would
not require an ongoing scrutiny of school operations and thus risk excessive church-state
entanglement.
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21 Young ]An African-American woman serving as probationary minister sued her church for race and
sex discrimination, as well as retaliation, after the church denied her a promotion. The
court held for the defense, asserting that Title VII inquiry would violate the religious
employer's First Amendment rights.
22 Van Osdol A female minister sued her supervisor and church, alleging that her novitiate minister
license was rescinded and the prior agreement allowing her to open a church was
terminated following her complaint that she was sexually abused by her supervisor. The
court held that her suit against the church was barred by the First Amendment that allows
religious organizations to hire and fire clergy at will.
23 Catholic iA Catholic nun working as an associate professor at Catholic University brought a Title VII
University sex discrimination claim against her employer after the Department of Cannon Law denied
her tenure. After establishing that plaintiffs duties were ecclesiastical in nature, the court
held that the Title VII claim was barred by the First Amendment and by RFRA.
A white elementary school teacher at a church-run school brought several claims, including
a Title VII action alleging discriminatory discharge and failure to transfer on account of
race. The court held that the enforcement of plaintiffs claim would infringe on the
employer's Free Exercise rights and thus should be dismissed.
25 Smith A secretary and a receptionist at a church filed claims against the Senior Pastor and the
church alleging that they were sexual harassed and that the church failed to stop the pastor's
offensive behavior following the complaint. The court denied defendant's motion to
dismiss on substantive and procedural grounds, stating that the church itself condemned
sexual harassment and that the jury could evaluate plaintiffs' claims without engaging
church doctrine and by applying a neutral law to the case at bar.
26 Combs A female pastor alleged sex discrimination after she was terminated from her position
following her return from a maternity leave. The court dismissed the case, holding that the
First Amendment barred judicial inquiry into the Church's administrative affairs related to
ministerial appointments.
27 [Roman A Director of Music Ministry alleged sex discrimination after she was demoted and
Catholic reassigned new duties. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that
Diocese governmental intrusion into a church employment decision would lead to excessive church-
state entanglement and violate the Free Exercise Clause.
28 Bollard A seminary student holding a novitiate license alleged that he was sexually harassed for
several years by his superiors. After applying the Lemon and Sherbert tests, the court
vacated the lower court decision to dismiss, holding that plaintiff's Title VII claim would
not violate the church's right under the Entanglement and the Free Exercises Clauses
because the plaintiff did not seek reinstatement and because the jury could evaluate the
claim without weighing doctrinal matters.
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TABLE 7. FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSES
(Bolded Case Numbers Indicate Where Ministerial Exception Has Been
Granted; Asterisks Mark a Ministerial Function Employee, and Underlined
Numbers Designate a Religion-Based Discrimination Title VII Claim)
Risk of Entanglment
High Low
H 1*, 8*, 10*,
- i 12*, 14, 16*,
- g 17*9, 21*,
h 22*, 23*, 24*,
26*, 27*
0
L 2, 4*, 5, 6, 7
0 9, 11, 15*, 18
2. w 20, 25, 28*
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TABLE 8. LEMON AND SHERBERT TESTS
LEMON TEST (L) SHERBERT TEST (S)
Establishment Clause Free Exercise Clause
The statute "must have a Consider "the magnitude of the
secular legislative purpose" statute's impact upon the exercise of
the religious belief'
1 Prong
Li. Statute Must Be S1. Regulation Must
Secular in Purpose Not Impede Free Exercise
The statute's "principal or Consider "the existence of a
primary effect must be one that compelling state interest justifying the
neither advances nor inhibits burden imposed upon the exercise of
2"' Prong religion" the religious belief'
L2. Statute Must Be S2. Regulation Must
Neutral in Stance Serve Compelling State Interest
The statute "must not foster Consider "the extent to which
'an excessive government recognition of an exemption from the
entanglement with religion'."' statute would impede the objectives
3" Prong sought to be advanced by the state.""
L3. Statute Must Be S3. Regulation Must
Entanglement-free in Be Least Restrictive Enforcement
Outcome Option
I. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
II. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citing Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
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TABLE 9. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ENTANGLEMENT
(Bolded Case Numbers Indicate Where Ministerial Exception Has Been
Granted and Asterisks Mark a Ministerial Function Employee)
[ 1i Risk of Procedural Entanglement(PE)
High (3) Meim(2) fl Low (1)
H
P" i 1*, 9, 7,16*, 17*, 8*, 11,















A. Evaluating church's A. Length of legal proceedings
administrative decisions
r B. Judging the employer's B. Breadth of subpoena
H good faith
C. Dealing with conduct C. Monitoring compliance
j, grounded in church doctrine
" D. Weighing the extent to which D. Class action suit
Splaintiff embodies church teachings
E. Pretextual defense E. Prospective remedies
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TABLE 10. PROTECTION UNDER FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT STATUTES*
CATEGORIES PROTECTED iiCR ADEA PDA ADA CR4









EMLOYERS EXEMPTED 11CR4 ADEA IPDA ADA ICR4
FROM STATUTE (1964) (1967) (1978) 1(1990) 1(1991)
U.S. Government * Yes No No No No
Religious Institutions (partially exempted) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Private Membership Clubs Yes No No No Yes
Enterprises Outside U.S. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Small Businesses (less than 50 employees) No Yes No No No
Small Businesses (less than 25 employees) Yes Yes No No No
Small Businesses (less than 15 employees) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*CRA-Civil Rights Act; ADEA-Age Discrimination in Employment Act;
PDA-Pregnancy Discrimination Act; ADA-Americans With Disabilities
Act.
Spring/Summer 2002] MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AND TITLE VII CLAIMS 157
. >- z I- z z z - z z z
z z z z z - z z z-
- Z Z Z Z Z z
~ ~ - z -z z z
~ ~ z~ z z z
~z z
- z z z z -z z
., )- . - z z , z
z - z z z  z >.  z z Z
0 ;- - - -
- z
z z ~ z >-z z z
Sz z z z z z Z
s Z z z z
> )- z z z z z z Z z
z~cj "_ --z -z_ z
- z - z Z. Z Z Z -
z _ - z z z . z z z. z- z
00
- z z z z z z
. o . z z z z z z Z
rz , z z Z z, Z ;,, Z Z Z
z >z z ;z z z Z Z Z
0.2
S1 Z Z
r o
